


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Near East/South Asia Report

No. 2812


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30 August 1983

NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT

No. 2812

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EGYPT

BUTRUS GHALI DISCUSSES EVENTS IN CHAD

PM151530 Paris LIBERATION in French 11 Aug 83 p 4

[Interview with Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Butrus Ghali by Jose Garcon in Paris on 10 August]

[Excerpt] LIBERATION: You are on your way home from Ndjamena. Do you now have the impression that a direct French intervention is certain or that things have not yet reached that point?

Butrus Ghali: The situation in Chad is serious, but Hissein Habre's government and forces intend to oppose the Libyan intervention. I do not know whether some imaginary or real threshold has been crossed today. But, as far as we are concerned, we have tried over the past 4 weeks to make international and African public opinion aware of the fact that there is a Libyan intervention in that country and that it must be condemned. Egypt and Sudan have done so. It was important to do that because there was some confusion about how to define the situation. We do not think it is a civil war but, instead, that there has been a Libyan intervention. Nonetheless, peaceful solution to this conflict must now be found, and that can be done within the OAU framework. In Libreville in 1977 the OAU set up an ad hoc commission with the job of settling the conflict between Libya and Chad, and that commission must be revived. Indeed the cause of the Libyan intervention is the problem of the Aouzou strip. If a solution, even a temporary one, can be found to that, it will be possible to settle this intervention.

If it was impossible to find a solution within the OAU framework, it would be necessary to act with the United Nations. The latter could send a commission of inquiry to the scene and we could take decisions based on the results of that mission. But the one does not rule out the other--diplomatic action can be undertaken at the same time as the military action which is taking place now.

LIBERATION: You do not seem to share the viewpoint of the French Government, which stresses the fact that it is primarily a civil war, or even a "leadership war...."

Butrus Ghali: There is obviously a "civil war" aspect, but we think the essential point is still the fact that there has been a Libyan intervention. We have been very clear on that for more than 1 month.

LIBERATION:--However has not the U.S. intervention in this affair made things worse?

Butrus Ghali: No, so far it has remained a fairly localized African conflict. And I do not think that the dispatch of American arms has really changed much or has internationalized this conflict.

LIBERATION: What scenario do you think is possible now? Do you think there can be a reconciliation between Hissein Habre and Goukouni?

Butrus Ghali: No. In our view a peaceful solution means an end to the Libyan intervention, in other words a settlement between Chad and Libya. The main thing now is to be able to end this conflict, and one way of doing so is to secure an agreement between the legitimate Ndjamena Government and Libya--an agreement which would make it possible to achieve a cease-fire between these two warring sides. I repeat once again, it is not a conflict between Goukouni and Habre, but between Libya and Chad.

CSO: 4500/255

STATISTICS ON LABOR FORCE GIVEN

Cairo AL-'AMAL in Arabic No 240, May 83 pp 18-20

[Article by 'Izzat Sami: "Labor Day and the Final Years of the Plan; a Statistical Report on the Accomplishments of Egyptian Labor in the Implementation of the Development Plan"]

[Text] During the first years of the plan the number of workers increased by 3.3 percent, annual wages rose by 4.5 percent, and productivity was up 5.1 percent.

If Labor Day--1 May--is an occasion for workers to reaffirm their determination to achieve their legitimate aspirations for a better tomorrow and a more comfortable life, it is at the same time an occasion on which to affirm their commitment to their work and their productivity. This is a real value, and no other is needed as the basis for the formulation of societal relations.

Perhaps it is a coincidence that 1 May this year falls after the economic and social development plan for the 5 years 1982-83 to 1986-87 has been set. This is a plan whose goals can be achieved only through the sweat and brawn of the workers. Thus, the celebration of Labor Day this year takes on a new meaning linked materially and directly with what our country's workers feel in celebrating this occasion. Most significant is the affirmation of the commitment of the labor force in our country to implement this plan on schedule and within budget.

Therefore, our nation's workers' celebration of Labor Day this year on 1 May comes as we are about to complete the first year--1982-83--of the development plan. That makes this celebration an occasion on which to pause to take stock and review the accomplishments of the workers' efforts and brawn during the first year, which is close to the completion of the plan.

Total GNP is estimated at 36,969,800,000 pounds, compared with 34,225,600,000 pounds in 1981-82. This is an 8 percent rate of growth. In examining the structure of the GNP it becomes clear that about two-thirds were produced by the commodity sectors which are aiming for total production of 22.9 billion pounds. Approximately 10.3 billion pounds of this--or 27.8 percent of the GNP--were produced by the industrial and mining sector. Approximately 5.6 billion pounds--15.2 percent--were produced by the agricultural sector, and about 4.5

pounds--12.1 percent--were produced by the petroleum sector. The commodity sectors thus contributed approximately 67.9 percent of the total increase in the GNP during the year, which is estimated at approximately 2,744,200,000 pounds for 1982-82.

Without going too deeply into the figures, reports examining the implementation of the plan show the Egyptian labor force in a positive light in several respects. We will divide the labor force according to type of work, production and services, in ascending sequence by growth as follows:

The total number of employed people amounted to 12,110,700, compared with 11,724,900 in 1981-82. They were divided into 6,591,900 employed in the commodities sectors, compared with 6,463,000 in the previous year; 1,859,000 employed in the production services sector, compared with 1,081,900 the year before; and 3,659,800 in the social services sector, compared with 3,480,000 in the previous year.

Wages. Total annual wages up to the end of the current year, amounted to 8,040,300,000 pounds, compared with 7,449,100,000 pounds in 1981-82. This was divided into 2,838,100,000 pounds for workers in the commodity sectors, compared with 2,632,600,000 pounds the previous year; 1,970,600,000 pounds for workers in the production services sector, compared with 1,821,700,000 pounds in the previous year; and 3,231,600,000 pounds for workers in the social services sector, compared with 2,994,800,000 pounds the year before.

Reports monitoring the plan indicate that average wages during the current year rose to 663.9 pounds per annum from 635.3 pounds per annum the previous year. Broken down by sector, average wages amounted to 430.5 pounds for employees in the commodity sectors, compared with 407.3 pounds the previous year; 1,060 pounds for workers in the production sectors, compared with 1,022.3 pounds the year before; and 883 pounds per annum for workers in the social services sector, compared with 860.6 pounds the year before.

The preceding is a general outline of the principle features of the situation in Egyptian labor in the various sectors. A closer examination will provide details about the distribution of these workers and wages, and their growth.

<u>Sector</u>	<u>Number of Workers</u>		<u>Total Annual Wages (in millions of pounds)</u>	
	<u>This Year</u>	<u>Last Year</u>	<u>This Year</u>	<u>Last Year</u>
The Commodity Sectors:				
Agriculture	4,296,400	4,274,500	818.5	786.6
Mining	40,600	39,500	32.7	29.3
Manufacturing	1,473,600	1,423,200	1,418.1	1,304.4
Petroleum	25,200	24,500	74.9	72.3
Electricity:	68,400	64,200	65.4	58.5
Construction	687,400	664,100	428.[text garbled]	

The Production Services Sectors:

Transportation and Communications	446,300	433,300	448.7	409.3
Suez Canal	18,900	18,800	29.1	25.6
Business	1,161,200	1,103,800	1,201	1,113.8
Finance	74,200	71,900	134.4	122.8
Insurance	14,200	13,600	14.6	13.3
Tourism, Hotels and Restaurants	144,200	140,500	143.7	136.9

The Social Services:

Real Estate Ownership	179,900	171,300	63.7	58.4
Public Utilities	69,600	66,200	28.9	26.9
Personal Social Services	942,200	895,600	421.7	405.1
Social Security	31,500	29,900	21.3	18.4
Government Services	2,436,600	2,317,400	2,000.696	2,000.486

While these figures clearly show a pattern of continual growth in the number of workers in the various sectors, and in their total wages, workers' average annual wages have also increased in the various sectors. Furthermore, productivity in locally produced items has also risen in all economic sectors with the exception of agriculture, as the following figures show:

(All Figures in Pounds)

	Average Annual Wages	Productivity		
	1982-83	1981-82	1982-83	1981-82
Agriculture	190.5	184	913	916.2
Mining	805.4	741.8	1,130.5	1,086.1
Manufacturing	962.3	916.5	1,940.7	1,842.5
Petroleum	3,972.2	2,951	140,777.8	120,212.2
Electricity	956.1	911.2	1,845.7	1,827.1
Construction	623.4	574.5	1,462	1,400.7
Transport and Communications	1,005.4	937.7	2,052.4	1,982
Suez Canal	1,539.7	1,361.7	38,074.1	36,840.4
Business	1,034.3	1,009.1	2,308.3	2,274
Finance	1,811.3	1,707.9	14,784.4	14,464.5
Insurance	1,028.2	977.9	3,612.7	3,455.9
Tourism, Hotels and Restaurants	996.5	974.4	1,660.9	1,641.6
Real Estate	354.1	340.9	2,229	2,081.7
Public Utilities	415.2	356.3	603.4	569.5
Social and Personal Services	447.6	452.6	919.1	904
Social Security	676.2	623.7	707.9	698.3
Government Services	1,106.5	1,072.7	938.5	899.5

General Indicators Regarding the Distribution of Workers

Let us summarize the important indications revealed in these figures. First of all, the number of employed individuals is 12,110,700, an increase of 3.3 percent. The distribution of these workers among the various economic sectors shows that the commodity production sectors offer several new job opportunities in production, estimated at about 130,000, of which 39.6 percent are in the industrial and mining sectors. An estimated 51,500 new job opportunities will be available in that sector. Of these, there are about 16,000 job openings in the food processing industry. There are also increased opportunities in agriculture, estimated at approximately 48 [sic] thousand, representing 37 percent of the total of new job opportunities in the commodity sectors. In the social services sector, there are about 180,000 new job openings, compared with 77,000 new job opportunities in the production services sectors.

According to the distribution map of all the workers in the various sectors, 54.4 percent are employed in the commodity sectors, 30.2 percent are in the social services, and 15.4 percent are in the production services.

Wages

With regard to wages the above figures show that average wages in the 1982-83 general plan are about 663.9 pounds per annum. That is an average growth of 4.5 percent.

The production services sector showed the highest average annual wages, at 1,060 pounds. This sector is followed by the social services sector with an average annual salary of 883 pounds. Average annual wages in the commodity sector as a whole are lower, at 430.5 pounds per annum, despite the fact that average wages in the petroleum sector amount to 2,972.2 pounds per annum.

The figures also show that total annual wages in the 1982-83 general plan, estimated at 8,040.3 million pounds, were 7.9 percent above 1981-82 levels. These wages were distributed among the various sectors as follows: The commodity sectors: 35.3 percent; production services: 24.5 percent; social services: 40.2 percent.

Average Wage Increases

The rate by which the total wages of workers in the production services sectors rose above the previous year is the highest, at 8.2 percent, because of the high rate by which the total wages of the workers in the Suez Canal and the financial and insurance sectors rose, 13.7 percent and 9.5 percent respectively.

The rate by which the wages of workers in the social services sectors rose was 7.9 percent, while the commodity sectors as a whole, were limited to wage increases of 7.8 percent. This was due to the relatively low rate by which of total wages of workers in the agricultural and petroleum sectors rose above 1981-82 levels, only 4.1 percent and 3.6 percent respectively, notwithstanding the fact that average wages in the petroleum sector were extremely high.

Productivity Rates

Average productivity in all economic sectors during the current year was approximately 1,760.1 pounds, 5.1 percent above the previous year. Average productivity of the production services sector was clearly the highest, at 3,068.5 pounds, and that was despite the fact that it rose by the insignificant rate of only 1.7 percent above the previous year. Average productivity in the commodity sectors rose by 7.7 percent to 1,757.2 pounds. Average productivity in the social services sectors rose by 3.3 percent, to approximately 982 pounds.

It can be seen that the petroleum sector has the highest rate of productivity inasmuch as its goal is to reach about 141,000 pounds per worker. It is followed by the Suez Canal sector at about 39,000 pounds. The sector with the lowest productivity was the public utilities sector with 603.4 pounds, and the social security sector with 758 pounds. This is due to the phenomenon of masked idleness and to the nature of the activity in those sectors in comparison with the other, more productive sectors.

An Honorable Scoresheet of Accomplishment.

With this honorable scoresheet of accomplishment in the first years of the development plan Egypt's workers can pause on Labor Day, 1 May, their heads held high with dignity, proud of the great accomplishments they have achieved and will continue to achieve. They will announce, as they are wont to do every Labor Day, their demands for all or part of what they are hoping for and striving for. But Egypt's workers, with their sense of patriotism and true sense of responsibility will not announce merely sectarian demands stemming from narrow conceptions. Rather, they will first define the requirements to which they must be committed before they demand. They understand that they must give before they receive, and the product of their giving must go to the entire country first, so that the edifice will rise, to shelter all the citizens--including the workers--in glory and pride.

9123
CSO: 4504/425

FEASIBILITY STUDIES OF SINAI COAL MINE COMPLETED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 13 Jun 83 p 9

[Article by Ahmad al-Tabrani: "The al-Maghara Coal Mine in Sinai: An As Yet Untapped Resource"]

[Text] Exploitation of the mine in the Governorate of North Sinai will realize \$75 million annually, \$35 million of which will be from [increased] oil [exports].

Last March the necessary studies were completed on the technical and economic feasibility of reopening and operating the al-Maghara coal mine in the Sinai, which was shut down in 1967 because of the hostilities. The studies have confirmed the feasibility of operating the mine with an initial production capacity of 150,000 tons annually, climbing in 7 years to 600,000 tons a year. The total amount that must be invested in the project is about 112 million pounds, in addition to 14.2 million pounds which are necessary to build housing facilities for the project's employees.

The director of the mine, Engineer Ahmad al-Muttalimi, said that the studies of the economic and technical feasibility of the project, which were carried out in cooperation with international consulting companies and the largest British company that specializes in this field, indicated that the mine had a hypothetical lifespan of 30 years.

The cost of production would be 24 pounds per ton, and transport would cost from 12 to 15 pounds a ton. Thus, the cost to industry at the sites of consumption would be between 36 and 39 pounds a ton, while the price of coal of the same quality on the international market is between 48.5 and 68 pounds per ton.

Several foreign banks have agreed to participate in financing the foreign component of the project. The Ministry of Industry may allocate a portion of the British loan, which will amount to 64 million pounds sterling, to improve the economics of the project and finance several of its stages. In particular, 16 million pounds of the loan was considered a grant to the Egyptian Government to be invested in financing certain requirements of the project.

Maj Gen Munir Shash, the governor of North Sinai, said that the al-Maghara coal project is one of the most important economic projects when first phase production was scheduled to begin in 1968. But production was halted as a result of the hostilities in 1967. Immediately after Egypt regained sovereignty over the Sinai the project became the object of considerable interest as part of the governorate's plan. The project is important for several reasons, among them the following:

The project will save \$40 million annually, the amount that Egypt spends on imported coal.

It will conserve crude oil currently used in the electric generating stations by replacing it with coal. This will provide an opportunity to export \$35 million worth of oil a year at current prices, so coal production will amount to a total of \$75 million a year.

There is also a social dimension. About 630 families will be absorbed in the mine region. They will be provided with housing facilities and all the essentials for living, far from the crowds around the strip at al-Wadi al-Dayiq.

Sami Harnush, the administrative director of the mine, said that a committee is now studying the best ways to use the coal, from both the technical and the economic perspective: whether to convert it to coke, or use it for electricity, or both, particularly in view of the fact that al-Maghara coal is the only coal capable of formation. We currently import 1.2 million tons of coal. Mechanized processes will be used. A new training center will be built. For the first time bedouins will be accepted for underground jobs. There are currently 20 of them. This is a completely new phenomenon. Furthermore, never before in the whole world has a mine been closed for 15 years, with poisonous, explosive and inflammable gases in the debris. Large-scale security precautions are needed. The al-Maghara mine is an international rarity, having been closed and then reopened.

Recently the committee on industry in the People's Assembly and the governor of North Sinai visited the project. The prevailing opinion was that it is necessary to work quickly to use, operate and exploit the mine for the various chemical industries and in the production of fertilizer and other secondary uses for the mine's product. A joint committee, to include the concerned ministries and organizations, was scheduled to be held to work rapidly to end the obstacles and move the project toward its production goals.

9123
CSO: 4504/425

EGYPT

BRIEFS

MEDITERRANEAN JOURNALISTS UNION HEADQUARTERS--The constituent conference of the Union of Mediterranean Journalists has elected journalist and writer Ahmad Hamrush as the Union's secretary general and chosen Cairo as its permanent headquarters. The conference was held in the Maltese capital Valletta 18-21 July. It was attended by journalists from 13 countries: Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, France, Spain, Italy, Malta, Greece and Cyprus. The conference was attended by a 15-man Egyptian delegation representing the various official and opposition political trends. The conference announced in its final statement that the new union is not contradictory to nor a substitute for any other journalists union. [Unattributed report: "Ahmad Hamrush General Secretary for Mediterranean Journalists Union"] [Text] [PM131921 Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 27 Jul 83 p 1]

CSO: 4500/255

HIGHLIGHTS OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN SOUTHERN REGION

Khartoum AL-AYYAM in Arabic 4 Apr 83 p 6

/Interview with Professor Ahmad 'Abd al-Rahman by Zayn al-'Abidin Ahmad Muhammad: "The Full Utilization of the Potential Resources of the Southern Region by Scientific Methods: Satellites Observe the Environmental Changes in Junqali Canal; Planning for Tourism Areas; date and place not specified/

/Text/ The trip which Mr Joseph Lagu, vice president of the Republic and chairman of the National Council for Junqali's Development, made to the site of the Junqali Canal project has many important aspects. Although the political aspect was strongly emphasized, the various other aspects should be also dealt with. Therefore, we interviewed Professor Ahmad 'Abd al-Rahman al-'Aqib, head of the National Research Council, who was invited by Mr Lagu to join him in his trip. This serious business trip produced important and positive results. Here is that interview with Professor Ahmad 'Abd al-Rahman al-'Aqib.

/Question/ What is the main purpose of the visit to the Southern region which you made in response to an invitation from the vice president of the Republic?

/Answer/ Mr Joseph Lagu invited me to visit the Southern region. The visit was basically to the Junqali Canal project. I must congratulate our brothers in the Southern region for this vast project from which they will benefit substantially. I must also commend the process of organization and development, especially the drilling machinery which almost constitutes a movable factory. The Canal will have a great effect in the development of the region. The main goal of the canal, of course, is to save the water in the dam area from evaporation. Among the members of the council together with me in this trip were Professor Hashim Uruwa, head of the medical research center; and Professor Larson, top expert in the A.I.D. It was a good opportunity to visit the area, observe the technical projects, and perform field studies of its social and anthropological structures. The recommendations which we have made are listed below:

1. The project of observing environmental changes by means of American satellites (the Landsat project) for continual observation of environmental changes by satellites should be carried through to completion.

2. A study should be done in collaboration with the concerned agencies in the state to transform the region to a tourist area, to allocate areas for wild animals which are abundant in the Canal region, and planning for several entrances above and below the canal route after examining in detail the migration of animals and dwellers.

We believe that if the 360 kilometer road along the Canal is paved, hotels are built, and necessary utilities are provided, this project will be one of the most successful projects in the tourism industry. The high elevation of the road would enable the passersby to see the Banko plain which extends to the Ethiopian borders and abounds with all kinds of wild animals. It would be possible, by creating some natural settings, to attract the animals to that side of the Canal. Laws for protecting animals should be passed.

3. The Council will take part in the veterinary and medical research required for the area. It will also, in collaboration with the local authorities and the University of Juba, help establish and subsidize the necessary laboratories.

4. The Council will assist the universities and hydrological research centers in making up a model for the entrance of the Canal.

5. The Council will assist in the renewable resources research in the area, especially the utilization of the Nilotc wild plants such as the (Bayumas and Bayukas).

Question You have announced earlier that the Council will extend its activities to villages. In this connection, scientific committees for regional research will be established. What steps have been taken in that direction especially since your visit to the Southern region must have provided opportunities for you to discuss this important issue?

Answer Indeed that was an excellent opportunity. However, this issue is a part of the building of a modern state program. This program was initiated in response to a request made by the president through the National Council on 3 June 1981 to researchers and scholars. In consequence, the National Research Council included the governors of the regions in its membership. This measure will guarantee the Council's Commitment to carry out programs in the various regions of the Sudan, such as program no 4 to develop the countryside and no 11 to build international cities and to support and develop the educational resources in the regions in accordance with policies of decentralization and the delegation of more authority to the regional governments. We have discussed this matter with the regional governments during the visit and positive results are expected.

Question In discussing the program of the modern advanced state during your visit to the Southern region, you asserted that program no 4, the development of the countryside, has been given the utmost importance. Because the cost of that program is extremely high, would you tell us how important this program is to the Southern region and the benefits it is expected to yield?

/Answer/ Now that the regional governments have their constitutional and political rights, much attention should be extended to social and economic development. Scientific research should be advanced and gradual development should be planned in order to utilize the potentialities of the resources of the region. The program of the modern advanced state contains many references to this effect such as program no 4, the development of the countryside, and no 10, the founding of research laboratories and developing scientific facilities in the regions. The following projects in the Southern region were discussed:

1. Information verification: the Southern region had enjoyed a large group of studies made by the British and missionaries. Some of these studies became lost during the civil war. The Council in collaboration with the region's authorities and the University of Juba will set up a comprehensive program to retrieve this information especially that which pertains to natural resources from the various centers and people's memory after careful study.
2. Skilled cadres: an inventory of skilled and technical cadres for all university levels will be made. The only attempt that has been made in that direction was in the agricultural sector.
3. The regional medical research laboratory in Juba should be completed and grants for training sessions will be awarded. The veterinary research laboratory, "Banyanj," in the Bur region should be completed.
4. The Council will assist in the renewable resources research especially the Namli project for electricity; the Kinyeti project, River Yei, Kalangei, and (Busra) projects; and the smaller energy projects.
5. We discussed many of these projects with the University of Juba. The university and its students will assist in these projects such as the information verification project, the conducting of the skilled cadres inventory, and traditional medicine research. We have also designated 10 annual awards of 50 Sudanese pounds each. Each university will be awarded two grants for the best annual projects conducted by the senior year students.
6. We have discussed with the regional authorities the locations of the model-self-reliant co-ops (which are our means of "returning to the countryside"). The primary objective of these co-ops is to achieve self-sufficiency. By scientific research and controlled development, the productivity of the land resources will substantially increase. These co-ops will be established in areas distinguished by certain economic activities or areas where such economic activities can be produced (product of renewable resources). With the assistance of some capital and utilization of scientific methods, the Council will be able to develop a co-op in order to serve as a model of advanced production and to be emulated by co-ops in other regions. I have pointed out many areas in the Southern region among them are: Kalkauka, for growing tea; Maskari, for growing sugar cane; Nayanj, for raising cattle; Busra, for growing pineapple and vegetables which can be canned at the Wad factory.

At the end of our interview, Professor Ahmad 'Abd al-Rahman al-'Aqib expressed his thanks to brother Joseph Lagu for giving him this wonderful opportunity, to

Mr Abil Alir, to Joseph Tambara, and to James Agath of Junqali. He also expressed his gratitude to all of those who assisted him in the gathering and interpretation of information regarding the 15,000 kilometer trip to the South, which we hope will be a good start for the National Research Council's programs, to direct its attention to the regions and villages and lead them to new levels of progress and prosperity.

12188
CSO: 4504/358

UPDATE ON SAWBA AGRICULTURAL PROJECT

Khartoum AL-AYYAM in Arabic 4 Apr 83

/Article by Mahjub Khayri: "The People's Assembly Discusses Sawba Agricultural Project, Three Main Factors are Required for the Success of This Vital Project, The Report of the Committee on Production is Discussed, Is the Agricultural Land Surrounding Khartoum for Recreation or Investment?"/

/Text/ The Committee on Agricultural Production and Irrigation, within the People's Assembly, took a field trip on 29 Jan to Sawba Agricultural Project to gain firsthand information on the nature of the project. On Tuesday, 29 March 1983 the People's Assembly discussed and endorsed a report on that visit presented by Dr Muhammad Sa'id Harbi, head of the aforementioned committee. Here is that important report:

Man is the basic element in the development process and God has made animals and plants serviceable to him. The Sawba mixed livestock farms are south of Khartoum, on 12,000 feddans. The success of this project depends on three basic matters which complement each other: irrigation, security, and paved roads. The resources are abundant, but the question is: How to utilize them fully and in the best possible way?

Training Workshop

The Committee visited the workshop where training on using agricultural machines is being offered. The machines, 75 tractors, were presented as a gift from the Italian Government. The office of Khartoum Province projects has successfully established in a very short time the aforementioned workshop for those machines. The Committee also visited the farms and found out to their dismay that some of the farmers were not regularly on location. However, some other farmers have taken extreme care of their lands despite the difficulties they had to face. Privately run farms get their water needs from al-Hizam al-Akhdar Canal. Officials contend that this use of irrigation will be detrimental to the state-owned farms when the area allotted to them is reclaimed in its entirety. There is no coordination between the state and private farms. The latter grow fodder and very little vegetables.

Animal Production

Animal production in the Sawba project is very promising. Approximately 3,000 cows on these farms produce 10 tons of milk per day. The farms have also enhanced milk production in al-Khartoum Province because of the fodder they supply. The farms have 30,000 chickens that produce 1,800 dozen eggs per day according to officials. Attentiveness, careful planning, and the introduction of foreign bloodlines will certainly increase animal production. Scientific research conducted by the staff of the project should be commended. This research has raised the production level of tomato, wheat and peanuts. They also successfully produced (a) a kind of fodder which is very effective in saline such as Jarawiya, and (b) indigenous organic fertilizer especially from chicken waste.

Security For the Project

Lack of security is a deep concern to farmers and discourages them from working in these farms. Mr Ahmad Shayk Idris Mana', commissioner of Khartoum Province, has agreed to put an end to this problem. Marketing presents another serious problem that cripples the farm production. Market prices especially of vegetables are controlled by some rich and influential brokers. Farmers regard the prices fixed by the Commissioner's Committee to be unfair. Had they been represented on that committee, the prices would have been made more reasonable and rewarding to them. The Commissioner asserted, however, that the farmers' union does have a representative, but he rarely attends the meeting.

Relations Between Farmers and Project

Relations between the Sawba Agricultural Project farmers and the government are not governed by any defined laws, but rather by sets of standing rules. A bill has to be passed to authorize the administration to utilize the entire land allotted to the project due to its utmost importance to the capital, which depends heavily all year round on the farms' production. In an attempt to solve the problems which the project faces, the Committee on Agriculture and irrigation has made a number of recommendations.

Committee's Recommendations

1. The founding of a board to supervise the mixed livestock farms as well as the private farms in that area in order to mobilize fully all the available land to grow vegetables and provide them to the capital. The projects of Khartoum Province could be joined in the future under the auspices of these farms.
2. The stopping of the current methods of irrigation employed by private farms. Water should be channeled from small minor canals instead of the main canal (al-Mayjar) according to the sounding planning of the irrigation engineers.
3. Water should be abundant for irrigation throughout the year for better and continuous land crops and for animal grazing. The main canal should be immediately cleaned.

4. The immediate completion of the Khartoum sewage project for irrigation in order to make more water available to the Sawba project.

5. Permits should not be granted for establishing private farms until the aforementioned board is founded and a law governing the relations between the farmers and the government is passed.

6. Rotation, type, and quantity of crops should be carefully planned and approved by the Ministries of Agriculture and Irrigation. Also, the committee proposed that the farmers be obliged to undertake ownership of the lands and special projects for which the land was distributed to them as free owners; namely, raising fodder and other crops, providing livestock products and not allowing it to be transformed into development property in the future.

7. Encouraging the farmers to raise poultry, cattle and other livestock, and to introduce stock that is of high productivity. The committee proposed that veterinary services be made available to the project until the goal of providing quality milk, dairy products, and meats at reasonable cost to the consumer is achieved.

To establish a dairy with the backing of project investors, specifically, to develop the al-Jazirah dairy. This would prompt increasing interest in cattle-raising both inside and outside the project.

8. Increasing agricultural guidance in the project and its management in a scientific manner to realize its goals, especially in view of strong opposition from farmers who could be involved in the project.

9. Reviewing the shares of petroleum resources allocated to the project and increasing them to meet the needs of the project.

10. Provision of security inside the project by installing police posts inside the project and circulating local patrols outside the project as well.

11. Organizing the marketing operations for the farmers by their participation in marketing committees and consultation with them on marketing issues.

It is imperative that the authorities disallow brokers from making bids in the central market so that food commodities can be available to the citizens at reasonable prices.

12. It is imperative that the road which links the project's area with the main highway be completed as soon as possible to guarantee uninterrupted delivery of farm products to the city all year round especially during the autumn.

12188
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BAHRAIN

BRIEFS

ALUMINIUM COMPANY LOANS--Manama, 14 Aug (WAKH)--The Gulf International Bank and the Bahrain National Bank have granted the Gulf Aluminium Milling Company guarantee facilities amounting to \$91 million. A responsible source at the Gulf International Bank has made a statement to today's issue of the Bahraini newspaper AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ saying the facilities granted by the two banks will be used in improving the milled aluminium factory which is scheduled to be built in the Sitrah area with a capacity of 400,000 tons yearly. The source said this loan will be repaid in installments over 8 years once the factory has been completely constructed in a period of 29 months. It should be noted that the company's capital is 100 million Bahraini dinars and has Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Bahrain as shareholders. [Text] [GF161432 Manama WAKH in Arabic 0710 GMT 14 Aug 83 GF]

CSO: 4400/473

BUTRUS GHALI, EGYPTIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, INTERVIEWED

Tel Avia DAVAR in Hebrew 24 Jun 83 pp 15, 16

[Interview with Dr Butrus Ghali, Egyptian minister of state for foreign affairs, by DAVAR Correspondent Sha'ul Tzedaka, in Cairo, date not specified]

[Text] Dr Butrus Ghali, Egyptian minister of state for foreign affairs, is among the only remaining leftovers from al-Sadat's government, the government which made the historic trip to Jerusalem in November 1977. The fact has not escaped the numerous observers and commentators who predicted that Ghali's life in the Foreign Ministry would be short, due to what was called at the time differences of opinion between him and al-Sadat.

Dr Ghali is the cornerstone of Egyptian foreign policy and over the years has become one of the most accepted Arab diplomats in the West. His broad education, his command of English and French, his keen intellect and his ability to express himself--all these qualities won him renown in Europe and the United States. From 1949 and until the important role he filled in the peace process with Israel, he was a professor of international affairs and international law at Cairo University. During the same period, he wrote several books, the most important of which is called "Foreign Policy in a World of Trade-Offs." Today, in addition to his ministerial position, he serves as president of the Strategic and Policy Studies Center in al-Ahram. The interview was conducted last Thursday afternoon, in Ghali's Cairo office.

[Question] Are you the one who coined the phrase "cold peace?"

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] Isn't it a contradiction of terms?

[Answer] No. The fact that there are direct lines of communication between our two countries and the fact that you were warmly received by the people of Cairo, that's one thing. The fact that our two governments have reached a point where it is difficult for them to cooperate, that's another perspective on the problem.

[Question] In other words, the expression does not encompass the unofficial relations between our peoples?

[Answer] I agree. That is the way I define "cold peace." It exists at the governmental and institutional level. Not outside of that.

[Question] Did you coin the phrase as a direct result of the war in Lebanon?

[Answer] Of course. I believe that the philosophy behind Anwar al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem was "no more war." The Israeli Government, or the Sharon government, declared a new war. That was a shock to Egyptian public opinion. What was the point of a peace agreement if the Israelis were only going to wage war somewhere else? If they use war as a means to resolve the problem? We told the Arab world: Look how civilized Egypt is; we sat at the negotiation table and conducted talks with Israel; you, too, must do this. Suddenly, they found out that instead of maintaining peace, Israel has acted aggressively against an Arab nation, against Beirut and against Sabra and Shatilla. The Egyptian people felt they had been used. In effect, we went back to the starting point of before al-Sadat's visit, and we now have to explain to this public that we must start the peace process anew.

[Question] You used the words "Sharon government." Did you purposely differentiate between that government and the Israeli public?

[Answer] As I understand the inner workings of your political system--and I've known it for almost 6 years now--I am almost certain that Sharon played a very important role in this adventure, which was disastrous for peace.

[Question] To what degree, in your opinion, does Sharon represent the political views of the Israeli citizenry?

[Answer] I was in Tel Aviv just 1 week before the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and I felt that Sharon represented an extremism that was spreading in certain sectors of Israel. Some of your journalist colleagues understood this as well.

[Question] Do you think that since his resignation as minister of defense, this extremist profile of the government has decreased?

[Answer] We hope so, We hope that those elements who believe in peace, in co-existence and the importance of dialogue, will reign supreme.

[Question] Did Israel, in her war with Lebanon, ignore the network of her relations with Egypt, by creating a rift between Egypt and the rest of the Arab world?

[Answer] Yes. The war complicated the peace process. One of the messages we tried to get across to the Israelis via Moshe Dayan, since his first visit in November 1977, was that Egypt has a position in the Arab world. If you are thinking in terms of a separate peace between Israel and Egypt, and you forget the other Arab nations--your thinking is wrong. There are 3 million Egyptians working in other Arab countries. And the Arab world makes its presence felt here in Egypt. You must take that into consideration. Any peace agreement that is signed can only be the first step in a series of other peace agreements and we must work together to achieve that.

[Question] Could it be said that there now exists normalization between Egypt and the Arab world, as compared with the situation which prevailed 5 years ago?

[Answer] Normalization has always existed, but in a quiet way, not officially. If you want to take a plane from here to any Arab country, you go on a 10-day waiting list. If you go to Cairo airport, you will see that every Arab airline operates from here.

[Question] That is, then, "cold normalization...."

[Answer] No. Let's say it is discreet normalization. You can't really talk about normalization because there are so very many trans-national interests among us. Three million Egyptians live in the Arab world. Even in a country with which we are in a state of cold war, like Libya, there are 200,000-300,000 Egyptians. The problem was that the Israeli Government, with all her expertise, does not have the capability to understand the structure of the Arab world. After 6 years of close contact, this leaves a bad taste. We have somehow failed to get through.

[Question] How do you see the results of the war in Lebanon now, a war which many Israelis have decided was unnecessary?

[Answer] There is no doubt that the war was a disaster and a loss to Israel in the strict sense of the word. But if you examine the war in terms of peace, dialogue, co-existence and encouragement for peoples to speak with each other--you'll find it is an even greater disaster.

[Question] Did Israel thus provide further proof that she does not understand the make-up of the Arab world, especially the network of inter-ethnic relations existing in Lebanon?

[Answer] Israel proved that she prefers short term solutions, like military confrontation, to negotiations.

[Question] What, in your opinion, was Israel trying to achieve in Lebanon?

[Answer] I don't know. I only know the results: The ruination of the peace process and the position of those who support peace in Egypt. The war in Lebanon served as a common ground for extremist factors: Arab, Palestinian and Israeli--all of whom had a common goal. They don't believe in peace, or in the negotiations being conducted among Arabs, Palestinians and Israelis. If you look carefully at both camps, you will reach the conclusion that the camp which believes in military confrontation won, and we lost the battle.

[Question] Did you consider cutting off diplomatic relations with Israel because of the war?

[Answer] No. We just brought our ambassador back home.

[Question] What is the next step?

[Answer] I don't know what the future holds, but it is clear to us that we do not want to encourage extremism. To the contrary, we want to reinforce the moderate camp, we want to strengthen the camp of peace supporters in Egypt and

in Israel. Let's be candid: Here in Egypt, too, we have extremists who are opposed to the peace process. The fundamentalists who assassinated President al-Sadat are fighting against peace.

[Question] How much power do these fundamentalists have?

[Answer] I believe their power is marginal and that they are not strong. They are the Gush Emunim of Egypt.

[Question] Was al-Sadat murdered because of the peace with Israel or because of internal problems within Egypt?

[Answer] One is related to the other. You can't separate them.

[Question] ..But in any event, the impression in Israel was that the fundamentalists attacked the president due to his attitude toward Islam.

[Answer] And also his relations with Israel. You need only read the newspapers. They wrote about it openly. And it was stated in the parliament, when they defended the peace agreement, and in the Foreign Affairs Committee. In a discussion on the Camp David Accords, we encountered resistance from certain fundamentalists in parliament.

The Labor Party Showed Its Weakness

[Question] An agreement between Israel and Lebanon has been signed. Why don't you send your ambassador back to Tel Aviv?

[Answer] The position of the ambassador to Tel Aviv is not related to the agreement. It has more to do with political atmosphere. What is the point of returning our ambassador if it is not to strengthen the peace process. That step would be pointless, even negative.

[Question] Don't you think the atmosphere has improved since the war?

[Answer] We are looking for a change in the political atmosphere, which we have not yet seen.

[Question] You don't think that the Israeli people's attitude toward the war in Lebanon has changed?

[Answer] You expect Egyptian public opinion to be aware of details about internal Israeli politics. The general impression is that the Labor Party said nothing after the attack began.

[Question] But wouldn't the Egyptian government prefer to see the Labor Party in power?

[Answer] Yes. Because until we discover that the Labor Party is worse than the Likud, we can have hope. I was the man who arranged the round table discussion with the Labor Party--with Simon Peres, Haim Bar-Lev and Abba Eban. I

was the man who flew back to Egypt especially to publish a joint announcement with Willy Brandt, Bruno Kreiskey and Shimon Peres. I was the man who sent an official delegation, headed by Mustafa Khalil, to be present for the first time at the convention of the party which chose Shimon Peres to be its leader. It was our policy to support labor. Unfortunately, labor did not win the election, and has displayed great weakness insofar as a confrontation against Mr Sharon's military exploits in Lebanon.

[Question] In your opinion, is there a difference between the first Begin government and the current one?

[Answer] I say emphatically yes. The agreement was signed thanks to two people. I don't want to detract from the significance of Prime Minister Begin's role, but in real terms, the two people with whom we worked on the agreement were Moshe Dayan and Ezer Weitzman. The day they both left the government was the day the peace process fell apart, at least with respect to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. And they left the government due to their opposition to Likud policy.

[Question] I may soon arrive at the conclusion that in your opinion the agreement was in a sense forced on Menahem Begin against his will.

[Answer] I did not say that. You are asking me radical questions after 3 o'clock in the afternoon, and that is not in keeping with our agreement. What I said was, that two people had significant roles in the signing of the peace agreement. First, in everything that has to do with the initial contacts, which were very important, like the agreement itself, because we didn't know each other and it was like coming together from outer space. The man who played the most important role in this regard was Ezer Weitzman. As far as the technicalities, it was Moshe Dayan.

Nothing Dies in Politics

[Question] In Israel, the people are convinced that al-Sadat chose the peace initiative because Begin was in power. Was that really one of his considerations?

[Answer] I think that the president was pragmatic. Who was in power then? Menahem Begin. You can't say: I will delay the visit until a change of regime takes place in Israel, to a regime headed by a more flexible leader. But if I did decide on action, I would have to deal with whomever was in power at the time. If that is Mr Begin--we'll do it with him.

[Question] But it was only 4 months after Begin took office. Was that merely coincidence?

[Answer] You shouldn't think that that was the reason al-Sadat chose to start the initiative at that time. I think that after the failure of the joint declaration in October 1977, after the failure to establish some contact with Syria and the failure to initiate something akin to the Geneva Conference, he decided that something drastic had to be done, for his desire to find a solution to the problem.

[Question] You surely know, since it has appeared in the Israeli press, that Begin said on more than one occasion that al-Sadat had a habit of calling you Butrus when he was pleased with you and Peter when he was angry with you.

[Answer] When we were in Jerusalem, President al-Sadat called me Peter one time and Butrus another time. Mr Begin asked me: What's your name--Butrus or Peter? I told him that in English my name is Peter and in Arabic Butrus. Kidding around, I said that maybe I'm called by al-Sadat when he is pleased with me. Begin expanded on that, adding that the meaning of Peter is stone, and when I was like a "hard rock," people would call me Peter.

[Question] When will the talks on autonomy resume?

[Answer] The talks on autonomy are linked to the Reagan Plan. The Reagan Plan is a substitute to the talks on autonomy. We have made it clear that we do not intend to resume any discussions unless it is in the context of the Reagan Plan, with Jordanian and Palestinian participation alike.

[Question] The Reagan initiative, then, is not dead--as so many believe?

[Answer] Nothing dies in politics.

[Question] Is the acceptance of the Reagan Plan like a prerequisite?

[Answer] No. When we started the talks, without Jordanian and Palestinian cooperation, we were accused of proceeding with an initiative without having a mandate from the other parties involved in the problem. We said: O.K. We've been trying for 2 or 3 years. Now we say: We won't go on unless the Palestinians and Jordanians join us.

[Question] If that's the case, then for us the near future looks quite grim, because it is hard to see how the Israelis or Palestinians would accept the Reagan Plan as the basis for negotiations.

[Answer] Why do you use the word grim? On the first of April, we were on the verge on reaching an agreement, and if we were on the verge once, there is no reason we should not get there again in the future.

[Question] Don't you associate resuming negotiations with the withdrawal from Lebanon?

[Answer] Of course not.

[Question] Do you justify the conditions Israel set forth for withdrawal from Lebanon, parallel to a Syrian withdrawal?

[Answer] We have chosen not to express our opinion on the subject. The decision of the Lebanese Government will be respected by us and will get my support. It is a sovereign government and they will decide what they have to do.

[Question] But you claimed that the Syrian withdrawal was an inseparable part of the Lebanese interest.

[Answer] Yes, I said that. And again--if the Lebanese Government does not see fit to demand Syrian withdrawal, we cannot interfere.

[Question] Has there been any change in Egyptian foreign policy since al-Sadat's assassination?

[Answer] There has been a change in style, not policy. There has been a change in personal approach, but not in content. The essence has remained the same. Even the group of activists remained the same.

[Question] To what extent did peace improve the economic situation in Egypt?

[Answer] First of all, peace encouraged greater tourism to Egypt. Second, it opened the Suez Canal, giving us a billion dollars a year. Third, the oil fields bring us \$3 billion. What's more important, the Egyptian way of thinking has changed. Instead of thinking in terms of military conflict, the Egyptian technocrats now think about construction and production and cooperation. This is of great importance and cannot be expressed in dollars.

[Question] What are your plans for Sinai and what has been done thus far on the peninsula?

[Answer] We have many plans. One of the most important is education. Around 100 schools have been opened in Sinai. We are trying to establish new villages near al-'Arish. There is a plan to cultivate fruit in Sinai. I wouldn't say that the plans are as grandiose as we might have hoped, but if you take a good look at things, you will see that a great deal has been accomplished over the last 2 years.

9811
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NEW COMMUNIST LIST, CONCEPT OF LEFTIST ZIONIST PARTY DISCUSSED

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 24 Jun 83 p 10

[Article by Natan Baruch: "Wanted: A Leftist Party"]

[Text] We have of late been witness to several "firsts." Now, we have reached a situation wherein the major Zionist party, the Alignment, has joined the anti-Zionist non-confidence vote proposed by RAKAH.

Experts say that since the birth of the state, there has never been such a phenomenon. There has always and forever been an understanding and agreement among all the factions in the Knesset, whatever their make-up might be, that RAKAH would never be a "leader" in events of this sort. There is, of course, no way to prevent RAKAH from voting as it wishes. And certainly there were times when RAKAH's votes were decisive in certain decisions. But when RAKAH suggests a no-confidence vote agianst the government--no one would join, not in the past, that is. It was always the kind of thing about which people said: It just isn't done!

Now, a new phenomenon is rampant, which will perhaps not be the last of the regressions and repudiations of what was once common practice in our lives. And who knows if there won't some day be a situation where everyone talks "brass tacks" with RAKAH. Why, for example, is it alright to conduct negotiations with them on the subject of choosing a new president, or to join them in a vote on the subject of choosing a new president, or to join them in a vote on the subject of the physicians' strike--when it is forbidden to vote against the government with them? And if that were allowed--why not offer them some portfolio in some government? Not in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Defense, of course, but something neutral and harmless, so that they would vote for a new government?

In short: Once a tiny crack is allowed to develop, the water starts to push through with incredible force, and the crack gets bigger and bigger, and the flood threatens to drown everything. I have no doubt that there are people in the Israeli political system who say (now quietly to themselves, but perhaps tomorrow out loud to everyone): Everything is allowed and it is fitting and becoming to topple the government in order to "save" the people from it. And if it means cooperating with RAKAH--let it be.

All these events must be understood against the background of the deplorable condition of the Israeli Left.

It is really quite incredible. In effect, other than RAKAH, there is no real representative of the Israeli Left in the Knesset. Yosi Sarid? He changes his tune so often that he constitutes a one-man band. Change? It is truly funny to see Virshovsky from northern Tel Aviv and Rubenstein from Afeqa talking in a manner not to dissimilar from Yitzhak Ben-Aharon and others like him. MAPAM? It is a phenomenon reminiscent of the greatest magicians in history: A "rubber ball" party that shapes itself to fit any situation.

Depending on the amount of noise made by men claiming to speak in the name of the Israeli Left, one can sometimes assume that we are standing before some unified, viable front. The media, especially television, naturally helps the situation, giving artificial life to all kinds of groups which under normal conditions would be greeted with a condescending smile. When, for example, the phrase "chairman of the SHELI leadership" begins to appear frequently in the press--what does it mean? SHELI didn't even get enough mandates for a seat in the Knesset. Recently, even this tiny splinter was divided into tinier bits of splinters. But the SHELI leadership (which amounts to 0.2 percent? or perhaps 0.3 percent) continues to voice reactions to every issue in the world, and there were those who were convinced that every time SHELI yawned, the event would be covered in the press.

There is only one logical possibility, which is: To establish a large Zionist leftist party in Israel. The Alignment clearly cannot be considered for the assignment. It is an ideological and organizational supermarket--such as is generally found among parties close to the center of the political map--which cannot therefore take an ideological stand. Thus, some other possibility must be explored.

Strangely enough, this possibility is right at our doorstep. At the end of this week, MAPAM is meeting to decide its direction. Many people in Israel are hoping that MAPAM will for once find the courage of its illustrious past and decide to break away from the Alignment.

With them two or three other groups will perhaps leave the Alignment (I wouldn't advise them to throw in their lot with Yosi Sarid: He would never give up the protective shield of his party). It is possible that a few of the prominent figures from Peace Now (although they, too, would never try to test their real strength as a movement at the polls) would go with them. And perhaps they would even be joined by a few of those who have a habit of making speeches, lecturing and appearing on stage day in and day out. One could put together a rather respectable lot and establish a Zionist, leftist party, of which we are so badly in need.

But is it serious?

Apparently not. The Israeli Left is very good at talking, but it does not have the courage to fight for real. From my point of view, I respect Ron Kohen and Uri Avneri more than Viktor Shem-Tov and his friends. Kohen and Avneri at

least dared to try. MAPAM continued to pussy foot around and occupy itself with that which it likes the best: Procrastination and soul-searching.

If that is the situation, what will happen? Nothing. Aside from the fact that RAKAH, given certain conditions, is capable of taking a leading role in the left. Anyone who understands the significance of that statement will surely be shaken with justifiable fear.

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BRIEFS

POTASH PROFITS DECLINE--Tel Aviv.--The Dead Sea Works sold considerably more potash in 1982/83 than in the year before, but made much less money. This was due to the world recession and depressed prices, the company announced yesterday. It produced 1,611,000 tons of potash, 8.3 per cent more than in the previous year, and exported 1,518,000 tons, an increase of 14 per cent. However, due to lower world prices, exports brought in only IS128 million in 1982/83, compared to IS142m. in the previous year, a drop of ten per cent. The company's gross income (from all sources including investments) stood at IS2.32 billion, an increase of only 112 per cent, that is to say, less than the index rise. Income apart from investments grew by only 63.2 per cent (much less than the index), to stand at IS873m. However, if the net profit is adjusted for inflation (advisory opinion 23 of the Chamber of Certified Public Accountants) the net profit drops to IS216m., compared to IS1,252m. the year before. [Article by Macabee Dean] [Text] [Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 28 Jul 83 p 8]

AIRCRAFT NOISE DAMAGING--Residents of Rehovot, Kiryat Ekron and Mazkeret Batya are subject to noise levels that would disqualify these places as residential areas by international standards, an expert told the Knesset's Interior Committee today. Children from these communities suffer hearing problems. Bracha Valery of the Environmental Protection Authority told the meeting, devoted to aircraft noise in Rehovot area, which is near a large air force base. "According to our noise exposure index, Rehovot, Kiryat Ekron and Mazkeret Batya fall within the 35-to-45 range. "In most countries an index number of 40 is the red line, above which no community may be established for purposes of domestic living," she said. Despite this, Valery added, 2,400 housing units are now being planned for Kiryat Ekron and in Mazkeret Batya, approximately 600 housing units are to be built. In a Health Ministry survey of third-grade pupils in these localities last year, 30 per cent of the children were found to have hearing problems. [Article by Aaron Sittner] [Text] [Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 28 Jul p 3]

FEWER APARTMENTS IN WEST BANK--The Ministry of Housing and Construction will not fulfill its obligation, as set forth in the budget law, to build 2,500 apartments in Judaea and Samaria during 1983/84. From an internal memorandum, it became clear that only 2,046 apartments would be built in Judaea and Samaria, i.e. approximately 20 percent less than what was promised. The memo also indicates that contrary to its obligations, there will be no new construction during the current fiscal year in the settlement of Giv'at Ze'ev, named after

Ze'ev Jabotinsky. New construction in Judaea and Samaria this year will in effect be even lower. Out of the 2,046 apartments mentioned above, 719 actually involve the finishing of units whose completion was delayed last year, and only 1,327 are units within this year's construction program. The Ministry of Housing will be building in five urban settlements on the West Bank. The breakdown is as follows: 874 apartments in Ari'el, 480 in Emanu'el, 420 in Alfe Menashe, 200 in Krane Shomron and 52 in Alon Morei. The construction will be implemented by firms which receive land practically free, and large amounts of capital financing from the Ministry of Housing. Rasko will build around 520 apartments, Tzavta around 300, Eshdar 300, Ben-Yakar 130 and Ramat 120. Most of the companies building for the Ministry of Housing in Judaea and Samaria are wholly or partially owned by entrepreneurs affiliated with the Herut movement or associated with it in some other way. [Text] [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 24 Jun 83 p 5] 9811

ARKIA FLIGHTS TO AUSTRIA--Arkia Airlines will be running its maiden voyage to Innsbruck, Austria this morning. "Arkia Charter" sells three vacation packages, to Innsbruck, Neushteift and Zeifeld. The flights will be made on Boeing 737s and will take 4 hours. [Text] [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 29 Jun 83 p 5] 9811

CSO: 4423/155

KUWAIT

CENTRAL BANK REPORT DATA FOR JUNE CITED

LD141152 Kuwait KUNA in English 1032 GMT 14 Aug 83

[Text] Kuwait, Aug 14 (KUNA)--At the end of June this year, domestic liquidity in Kuwait totalled KD.4,268 million compared to KD.4,339 in May, indicating a two percent drop, according to the monthly review of the Central Bank released Sunday.

Upon considering the components of economic liquidity, we find that money increased slightly that month reaching KD.1,283 million compared to 1,281 million in May 1983, the report added.

As for the second components of domestic liquidity (quasi money), this fell by 2 percent from KD.3,058 million in May to KD.2,986 million in June.

This drop was most significant in time deposits which fell from KD.2,194 million to KD.2,144 million (two percent) and private deposits in foreign currency which also dropped from KD.427 million to KD.405 million (five percent).

Claims on the private sector, the report said, increased by one percent or KD.30 million would be imputed to KD.11 million increase in credit facilities and an increase of KD.19 million (two percent) in domestic investments and claims on specialized banks.

Net foreign assets of the banking system (Central Bank and commercial banks) reached KD.2,265 million against KD.2,251 million, the previous month, the report indicated.

Central Bank assets, which reached KD.1,753 million at the end of June, consist of foreign assets, rediscounted commercial papers and other assets. The Central Bank's foreign assets consisting of gold, reserve account with the International Monetary Fund [word indistinct] deposits and other assets reached KD.1,409 million at the end of June.

Rediscounted commercial papers reached KD.296 million indicating an increase of two percent over the previous month, the (CBK) report added.

On the liabilities side, the reserve money with the Central Bank dropped from KD.858 million in May to KD.764 million in June, i.e., by 11 percent.

This drop was represented in the balances of local banks (32 percent) and the Central Bank (11 percent), it pointed out.

The commercial banks' aggregate balance sheet increased by four percent over the previous month reached KD.8,833 million compared to KD.8,504 million in May, the report said.

Upon reviewing the assets of commercial banks, we notice a change in the distribution of these assets. While the bank's reserve money fell from KD.326 million to KD.260 million in June, i.e., by 20 percent, foreign assets increased from KD.2,007 million to KD.2,125 million, i.e., by six percent.

The commercial bank's foreign assets of balances with foreign banks which increased by six percent, advances and discounts to non-residents which also increased by six percent and foreign investments, mostly comprising bonds and shares, which increased by only two percent.

On the liabilities side, there was no change in sight deposits and reserve capital compared to the previous month. There was a slight drop in quasi-money and government deposits which fell by two and four percent respectively.

The increase appeared most significant in foreign assets which rose from KD.1,142 million to KD.1,235 million, i.e., by eight percent and other assets which increased by 14 percent, the report concluded.

CSO: 4400/473

KUWAIT

COMMENTS ON 'BRIGHT STAR 83'

GF141918 Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 13 Aug 83 pp 1, 10

[Editorial: "From Washington to All Arab Capitals"]

[Excerpts] Will the United States really recognize the independence of Arab countries? Will it realize that it is the right of the Arab peoples and governments to have complete sovereignty over their territories without any foreign or external interference or influence? Will the United States recognize the freedom of the Arab peoples to decide the course of the internal development of their countries and the right to pursue a nonaligned and independent foreign policy?

These questions which deal with essential principles and fundamentals must be asked now particularly in the current circumstances as the United States is conducting the biggest military demonstration, which it called "Bright Star Maneuvers 83," in a large area extending from the Arabian Gulf to Africa, with the participation of armed forces of Egypt, Sudan, Oman, and Somalia.

In this manner, the United States is following a policy of pressuring, blackmailing, and threatening the Arab nation while ignoring all international norms, the rights of peoples, and the sovereignty of independent nations. All this is being done on a large scale with the increasing Arab moderate position toward the United States and while the Arabs have not adopted a policy of putting pressure on the United States, including the minimum legitimate pressures, such as withdrawing ambassadors, for example, reducing the volume of trade exchange, or curtailing investments and other pressures, and this is the usual pattern between the states, even states which are not hostile to one another or do not have sharp differences.

Within these circumstances of Arab complacency and collapse and the continuous truce with the United States, the U.S. administration loudly and openly announces its intentions in the region by literally saying: "You may be really independent. You have your armies and systems of rule and enjoy membership in the United Nations, but we are militarily present in your air spaces, coasts, and lands to support the designs of Israel against you until the very end. Your only duty is to serve the U.S. administration and to be its satellites." This is the blustering U.S. message, for which the title "Bright Star" was chosen.

When will the Arabs realize the fate which is awaiting them? Will they merely leave some dear parts of the Arab world, such as Lebanon and Libya standing alone, or will they rise to confront the danger facing them before it is too late and before they witness another colonialist reign that is harder and more dangerous than the previous reigns, from which they suffered? No more or less, this is the option before the Arabs.

CSO: 4400/473

CURRENT INVESTMENT CONDITIONS ANALYZED

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 3, 30 Apr 83 p 32

/Article by Ibrahim 'Awwadah: "Investment in Lebanon Is Part of a Waiting Game"/

/Text/ The apparent freeze in investment activities in Lebanon since the beginning of the Israeli destruction last June today continues to be a cause for distress and mental anguish on two levels--the official and the personal. Its existence has become a clear sign of the development of the political and security situations and has gone beyond the economic and social hazards. Lebanon, which has suffered from war the past 7 years remains steadfast, in spite of the pressure of these events, thanks to the faith of her people in life, to the dynamics and particular characteristics of its economy and last, but not least, thanks to individual initiative, which represents the fundamental basis of the Lebanese economy and its life spirit. However, this picture changed after the destruction. Individual initiative became "cowardly" somewhat and the nation's capital was shaken, overcome by speculation and betting--the reverse of what it had been and what Lebanon had known before. There was a great flight abroad in search of safer, more secure investment.

Lebanon's entry into the game of withdrawals and antiwithdrawals and the faltering of the current negotiations in this regard, as well as the recent political developments in the region all have contributed collectively to this obvious and dangerous freeze in the investment fields.

The statistical indicators show that the amount of investments in the industrial sector, for example, from last June until the end of the past March was very modest and did not exceed several million Lebanese pounds, 15-20 million pounds, while the amount of these investments in the same period during 1981 reached more than 300 million pounds.

What is being said about the investment situation in the industrial sector also applies to the agricultural and tourist sectors, and to the real estate sector as well, which was hit by a fatal relapse after having witnessed during 1980-81 and through the first part of 1982 a flourishing the likes of which had not been seen even before the years of the /civil war/.

However, the single sector that remains apart from this stagnation is the currencies trading sector, which is currently witnessing frantic speculation,

championed by the commercial banks that are looking for investment activity in order to absorb their "glut" of liquidity. This is in spite of the danger of this speculation both on the national level (the exchange rate of the Lebanese pound) and in terms of the interests of the depositors.

If the Lebanese national capital today continues in a contest of waiting, now that domestic investment has been linked and entangled with the game of withdrawals and antiwithdrawals and with the important political events that are underway in the region, then this does not have to mean surrender to the current state of affairs--waiting for a quick political miracle or something like that.

Indeed, the opposite is correct. This phase of waiting must be exploited and used beneficially to rebuild the national economy and to provide its infrastructure in order to be ready when the time for starting over in a better and more advantageous manner draws near.

Lebanon today stands at the threshold of a new phase in its history called the building and development phase and from now on must work quickly for the refusion of the local market in a single structure where productive investments are made on the basis of an expanded national market. Likewise, local production factors must be given the opportunity to look to the various economic sectors to secure the favorable climate for inducing investment at a suitable time, since the expansion of investment that Lebanese economy is expected to experience in the coming phase demands initiative, and quickly, to provide and modernize infrastructure and to work to reconnect parts of the economy to one another. The Lebanese market in its present state is fragmented, and each of its component parts is oriented externally more than it is toward the other parts, which weakens the local economic integration and exposes the country to the dangers of foreign competition and this is what must be appreciated in this waiting phase, before we reach the phase of rebuilding, construction and development.

9614
CSO: 4404/441

LEBANON

PRESENT, FUTURE HOUSING PROBLEMS DISCUSSED

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 3, 30 Apr 83 p 31

/Article: "Housing Problem Explodes; Demand for 400,000 Homes by Year 2000"/

/Text/ Lebanon will need 400,000 homes in the year 2000 and will have to buy and build 6,000 new housing units and refurbish 1,000 units in 1983. This is what the Minister of Housing and Cooperatives Baha' al-Din al-Bisat announced in a study he prepared and in which he included a review of the housing situation in Lebanon. The fact is, the housing problem in Lebanon is an old one whose roots go back to the sixties, after Lebanon began to witness stupendous growth on many different levels--social, economic, and in the standard of living, all of which together contributed to causing evident disruption in the human order, whereupon the rate of immigration from the countryside to the city rose by very large and unexpected amounts as a result of the increase in economic activity in the capital, Beirut. From this began the housing problem and the capital was at the heart of it.

After the War

The Lebanese war came along in 1975 and exacerbated this problem, and it became more complicated and dangerous in light of the forcible transformation that the war and its aftermath brought about, wherein the cities and villages that were safer than Beirut and some of the other towns witnessed massive human migrations in their direction with which they were not prepared to cope. Thus there arose new housing problems. Adding to that was what the Lebanese war caused in the way of large and tangible losses to the buildings, especially in Beirut and its southern suburbs, where the concentration of houses is the greatest in all of Lebanon.

The Housing Minister Explains

Minister of Housing and Cooperatives, Eng Baha'-al-Din al-Bisat, says about this crisis: "It can be concluded from the UN estimates of Lebanon's housing needs to the year 2000 that approximately 400,000 homes will be needed to meet the ongoing shortage in housing and to eliminate the severe crowding, and also to replace makeshift housing. Measures must be taken to address the demands that will result from the increase in the number of residents in Lebanon, which are estimated to be around 4 million in the year 2000, based on a 2 percent population growth rate, with the average number of members in a family being 5.3 persons."

Minister al-Bisat said that, according to the UN statistics, the number of houses that must be provided by the year 2000 comes to 400,000, to be distributed among the districts according to the following plan: Beirut and its suburbs: 60,000 homes, or 37.5 percent; the districts of Mt Lebanon: 40,000 homes, or 25 percent; South Lebanon governorate: 20,000 homes or 12.5 percent; North Lebanon governorate: 20,000 homes, or 12.5 percent; the Biqa' governorate: 20,000 homes, or 12.5 percent.

Minister al-Bisat links the construction of 400,000 homes to a comprehensive plan in the future to remedy the crisis so that this source of distress for the state and the citizen will no longer exist. He suggests that the state undertake to carry out a complete housing survey in order to draw up a real estate policy in the interest of providing housing and to draft rent legislation in the service of the housing policy, and to consecrate the social content of this policy. Otherwise Lebanon will remain a setting for housing problems in the absence of scientific and effective planning and in this way Lebanon is just like the developing countries that have not as yet been able to solve their housing problems, due to the lack of planning and the slowness in dealing with them.

9614
CSO: 4404/441

OMAN

PAKISTANI EXPATRIATE WORKERS TO GROW BY 10 PERCENT

GF131138 Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 12 Aug 83 p 4

[Correspondent's Report]

[Excerpt] Muscat--A 10 percent annual multiplier growth can be expected in the Pakistani expatriate population in Oman for "some time from now" and their number by the end of 1983 can be in the vicinity of 55,000.

According to Mr Mohammad Azam Rathore, community welfare attache at the Pakistan Embassy here, the current Pakistani population in Oman is around 50,000, a majority of them being of the unskilled and semi-skilled category.

On an average, 700 employment visas get attested every month at the Muscat embassy. As against this, nearly 100 Pakistanis get repatriated every year. "It is safe to assume that nearly 5,000 to 6,000 Pakistanis take up jobs every year in Oman," Mr Rathore told KHALEEJ TIMES.

It is estimated that the per capita income of a Pakistani in Oman is RO 75, on an average, a Pakistani repatriates two-thirds his earnings, on a monthly basis, through commercial banks.

CSO: 4400/468

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

NAYIF HAWATIMAH SPEAKS ON PALESTINIAN POLITICS

Nicosia AL-HYRRIYAH in Arabic No 83, 10 Jul 83 pp 6-9

/Interview with Nayif Hawatimah, general secretary of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, by Hazim Ibrahim: "Nayif Hawatimah to AL-HURRIYAH: If the Scope of the Fighting Widens, It may Become an Earthquake Which Will Strike at Everyone"; date and place not specified/

/Text/ Our meeting with Comrade Nayif Hawatimah, the general secretary of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, was supposed to deal with three topics divided on the basis of importance in the following fashion: the fighting within Fatah and its negative effects on the Palestinian level, the current developments in the direction of the unification of the Popular and Democratic Fronts, and, finally, something of the active American maneuvering being witnessed by the region, especially in connection with the Israeli-Lebanese agreement.

However, sudden developments prevented our meeting with Comrade Hawatimah from dealing with anything but the first topic, which is certainly the hottest and most difficult one on the Palestinian level. The text of the interview follows.

If the Fighting Widens, I May Become an Earthquake Threatening Us All

/Question/ Our Palestinian people and progressive circles in the Arab region and the world are following with great apprehension the conflicts and fighting among brothers happening on the Palestinian level. Let us ask this in the beginning: What, in your opinion, are the reasons for the conflict within Fatah?

/Answer/ Worry and bitterness are something perfectly legitimate among our people, as well as in the broad nationalist circles and in the ranks of all the forces of goodness, liberation and progress in the world.

What is happening today is fighting among brothers-in-arms which could slip out of control and become an earthquake which would strike at everyone--the Palestinian revolution, Syria and the Lebanese forces in particular, and all the forces of Arab liberation in general--while all events in the region necessitate that things go the other way, in the direction of a rectification and development of the struggling relations between the PLO and the Lebanese nationalist forces, as well as Syria, in order to confront the occupation forces and the Phalangist-American-Israeli agreement and to force the enemy to leave the pure Lebanese

territory unconditionally. All this must be the start of the continuation of the struggle to bury the Reagan Plan and concentrate friendly Arab energies on the side of our national and patriotic rights, in order to arrive at the realization of the goals of our people and our nation: forcing the enemy to withdraw from all the occupied Arab lands and insuring the right of our people to return, decide their fate, and set up an independent Palestinian state under the administration of the PLO in an unconditional fashion.

Fatah's Conflicts Are Old

The destructive conflict within Fatah has pushed the situation in another direction, so that everyone is busied with the conflict within Fatah between brothers-in-arms. The main battle has been thrown into the shadows, and this is what saddens our people and friends and brings joy to our enemies. The Fatah crisis is not new; its roots go back to before 1978 and took its early forms in 1978. At that time, the Democratic Front, together with four other factions, took a united position to solve the matters at issue in the dispute by means of democratic dialogue, rather than by fighting. Then the crisis almost exploded anew at the Fourth Conference in 1980. The disputes revolved around political positions and internal organizational relationships. Therefore, the crisis is not the result of the aftermath of the invasion of Lebanon and the brave Battle of Beirut. It simply continues today in the shadow of harder and crueler circumstances which now surround our revolution and our people's cause, now that we have lost our contact lines with the Zionist enemy in southern Lebanon and the revolution has lost its excellent logistic position in Beirut under the banners of the nationalist forces and the Lebanese masses.

Indeed, we in the Democratic Front are continuing the firm policy which we adopted following the Fatah crisis of 1978 and 1980. Now more than at any other time we are holding to the necessity of halting the fighting between brothers-in-arms on the territory of our brother, Lebanon. The door of democratic dialogue must be opened in order to work out solutions for the political and organizational problems in Fatah. This is what we took the initiative in declaring ahead of others at the press conference which we held on 22 May only 12 days after the start of the protest and opposition movement in Fatah. We were the first faction to say yes to the solidification of Fatah's political position and democratic reform in the context of the unity of Fatah and the PLO, and no to fighting between brothers-in-arms. All rifles must be turned toward the chest of the Zionist enemy who occupies our country, the Golan and the pure lands of Lebanon.

We Undertook a Comprehensive Critical Review

Question Recently, after the Resistance left Beirut, many views have been brought forward concerning the experience of the Resistance in Lebanon. There are some who blame the Resistance for its failure up until now to carry out a critical re-evaluation of its experience to the desired degree. To what extent can that be considered a cause of what is happening now?

Answer A courageous, critical re-evaluation is a duty incumbent on every revolution, as well as every national liberation movement, at every stage of its nationalist and liberationist struggle.

If we recall the chain of events and the crossroads which our revolution has passed through, then we will recall immediately the series of reviews which the Democratic Front took the initiative in carrying out both on the public, national level and in the ranks of the Front itself. The last one came after Beirut, when a comprehensive, critical report, embodied in the report of the front's Central Committee, was done in December 1982. It was also embodied in the article I wrote which was published in the magazine "Palestinian Affairs" in February 1983.

Also, our front carried out an internal critical review which dealt with elements which showed negative signs in the course of the fighting. A number of measures were taken on the organizational level concerning them. Moreover, an evaluation was carried out of a number of cadres who were prominent in the areas of combat and won membership in the Central Committee of our front.

To call what is happening merely a critical re-evaluation after the invasion of Lebanon and the Battle of Beirut is tantamount to cutting the tree off at its root. Critical re-evaluation is essential at every stage of the revolution. Such a re-evaluation after Beirut forms but one link in the chain of the Fatah crisis. As for any attempt to limit things to the post-Beirut period, it amounts to an incredibly naive oversimplification of the analysis of what is happening in and around our Palestinian theater.

Stop This Hemorrhage

Question Despite everyone's insistence on the principle of democratic dialogue, a continuing propaganda and military escalation is occurring. Can one say that the opposition within Fatah has made a mistake in its administration of the conflict, which was supposed to stay democratic?

Answer I will let the brothers involved in the opposition within Fatah answer that one. As for the factions of the revolution, at their head the Democratic Front, the Popular Front and the Palestine Liberation Front and as for our people, expressed through their demonstrations, their acts of faithfulness, and their black flags, for all these the answer is no: no to the fighting and yes to unity and to reform on the basis of democratic dialogue. This is exactly what all the Arab and worldwide forces of liberation are calling for today: Stop this hemorrhage, solve the disputes by democratic means, and work to concentrate all energies on confronting the Zionist enemy, the imperialist American enemy, and the defeatist Arab enemy who dance with joy at every fight between the brothers-in-arms.

Question About a week ago, you met with the Soviet ambassador in Damascus. There have been a number of meetings between yourself and some of the ambassadors of the socialist countries. What is the true Soviet position vi-a-vis what is happening?

Answer The Soviet comrades have a firm and clear position against any form of fighting within the ranks of the Palestinians. They support the concentration of all forces within the framework of the PLO, which is the sole representative of our people, as well as the solution of political and organizational conflicts

via democratic dialogue. All this has been confirmed by the series of Soviet positions, beginning with the letters of Comrade Anropov to the Syrian and Palestinian leadership, followed by the famous Pravda article of 30 June which criticized the fighting and the attempts to destroy the unity of the PLO, as well as Washington's political gestures, which are designed to sow sabotage among the Palestinians, to harm Syrian-Palestinian relations in particular, and to harm Arab-Palestinian relations in general.

Two Currents in the Arab Mediation Efforts

/Question/ Despite active Arab mediation recently in order to resolve the disputes, things have stayed the same, if not escalated. Is there an implicit Arab desire for the dispute to continue?

What, in your view, are the real Arab positions vis-a-vis what is happening?

/Answer/ The evidence indicates that there are two currents in the Arab mediation efforts. One arises from a position based on principle which is eager to preserve the unity of the revolution, the PLO, and the PLO's political and nationalist-combative line. This is the position of Algeria and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. Then there is another current led by Arab reaction which is trying to fish the muddy waters within the Palestinian scene and within Syrian-Palestinian relations, so that the wound in Palestinian ranks will continue to bleed and enervate the Palestinian scene, Syria, the nationalist Lebanese forces, and the steadfast masses of Lebanon's Biqa' valley. The goal of this current is to hold an Arab summit conference which will impose conditions favorable to America's solutions to the Lebanese issue and our patriotic and national cause.

We must recall that everyone is busy with the Fatah crisis, combat operations, and the internal Palestinian situation, instead of continuing to concentrate their fire and mass their forces for the burial of the Israeli-Phalangist-American agreement. In this context, it is not surprising that Washington has taken in this tragic internal situation and sent its secretary of state, Schultz, once again to the Middle East in order to exploit current circumstances so as to exercise more pressure on the Palestinian revolution, Syria, and the nationalist Lebanese forces. This is being done with reference to the struggle being waged against the infamous agreement of humiliation and submission.

It Was We Who Constantly Suggested Democratic Reform

/Question/ In a previous interview with Radio Monte Carlo, you expressed optimism concerning the possibility of arriving at a solution to the conflicts which have broken out, on the basis of the PLO's unity, democratic conflict resolution and the rectification of the organization's relations with Syria. Do you still believe this is so?

/Answer/ The position of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, with its key place in the ranks of our people, our revolution and the PLO is a firm position based on principle which is struggling in the direction of solving the Fatah crisis on the basis of a ceasefire accompanied by democratic reform

with Fatah and the Palestinian scene in general. This is to be done on the basis of the phased organizational program formulated by the National Council (the January 1979 session). This program was suspended due to the actions of forces interested in establishing a monopoly in the ranks of the revolution and the PLO. They have long worked to commandeer any and all democratic reform operations approved by the council. Moreover, they have tried more than once to bypass the political program and the decisions of the National Council concerning all political issues on the working agenda of our people and revolution.

Before the invasion of Lebanon, during the war, and during the battle of Beirut, we struggled, as we continue to do, to rectify and develop further Palestinian-Syrian relations. We did this on the basis of the decisions of our National Council and of the Arab summits which all focus on concentrating all forces to force the enemy to leave the occupied territories and to insure the right of our people to decide their destiny and set up an independent state unfettered by limitations of conditions, as well as to protect the PLO's united representation of our people and to reject any and all formulas whereby that representation would be transferred or delegated or a trusteeship would be set up. Finally, we must embrace in our work the decisions of our National Council, the last of which were made in Algeria. It is truly within this context that the form of the firm, nationalist and pan-Arab relations between the PLO and Syria can be drawn up. We can thereby place the principal conflict with our Zionist enemy over any secondary conflicts which spring up among the sons of the one nationalist and pan-Arab rank.

Who Is For Recognition of Israel and Who Is Against It?

Question The opposition within Fatah has issued statements which threaten to shift the conflict to the entire Palestinian scene. This is especially so with regard to the Democratic Front. What is your opinion of that?

Answer In a previous letter to a Kuwaiti newspaper, I said word for word: The solution to the Fatah crisis necessarily supposes containing the conflict within the context of a democratic dialogue between the two sections of Fatah, as well as a ceasefire, rather than a spreading of the conflict over the entire Palestinian scene, which would work destructive harm on all the forces of the revolution.

We in the Democratic Front insist without reservation on continuing the struggle for the unity of the revolution and the PLO, on the basis of dialogue and democratic reform carried out to solve the Fatah crisis and apply the phased program in the area of relations between the revolution's factions and the PLO's institutions.

As I said as well to the Kuwaiti newspaper, it is easy to pass out accusations and widen the scope of the conflict, but difficult to bear patriotic responsibility with an inclusive spirit which is far from accusations and insults. Our revolution is the expression of a national liberation movement with a broad base which contains within its ranks all types of class, political and ideological currents. It represents all the patriotic classes of our people which are interested in returning, in deciding their fate, and in independence. In any such broad context

there are bound to be conflicts between positions and styles of running the nationalist struggle. But we in the Democratic Front constantly focus on the main conflict with our nationalist enemy, while continuing to solve conflicts in the ranks of the revolution through dialogue and democratic struggle. We submit our position and appeal to the broad masses, staying far away from the levelling of accusations. In this context, we have dealt with all attempts to widen the scope of the conflict. We have been and still are eagerly desirous of not making our brothers' positions into an excuse for widening the crisis. I told the Kuwaiti newspaper quite literally: These are our documents and positions and the statements made by our front in the last session of the National Council. All of them point toward managing the conflict and against the surrender-oriented Israeli-American solutions and the defeatist Arab solutions. All are against Camp David, the Reagan Plan, and the Phalangist-American-Israeli agreement and for the concentration and unity of the Progressive Front (Syria, the PLO and the patriotic Lebanese forces) in confronting the front of our enemies. All this is well known to the broad masses of our people and all the forces of liberation and progress in the Arab countries and the world.

What Abu Salih Says Is Clear

In addition, I gave the Kuwaiti newspaper a real example: Brother Abu Salih has issued a statement accusing us of calling for recognition of the enemy's state. However, all the positions adopted by our front contradict that completely. We reject any recognition of the enemy's state and struggle for the sake of our people's rights without limitation or condition. Take the example of the statement printed in LE MONDE in January 1982 which was ascribed to us, but which we immediately denied all knowledge of. If we look at the facts in front of us in the 26 June 1983 issue of the Lebanese magazine AL-SAFIR, specifically, in a long interview with Brother Abu Salih, we find him saying quite plainly that it is my duty not to compel the Palestinian leadership to recognize Israel without getting anything in return. Rather, we should have rejected the seventh clause in the Fez declaration. In return, so that the Arabs would agree to a program for settling the Middle East crisis, we should have said that we were not against that. But for agreement to be asked of us without anything being given in return for recognition of Israel is a colossal error, especially since such a card ought not to be given up for nothing.

Our position is 180 degrees away from that. We are against giving the Arab states the right to agree to a program for solving the Middle East crisis, because the essence of the crisis is our Palestinian cause, and the Arabs have no right to implement any solution against our people or behind their back. For precisely this reason, we fought al-Sadat and his bilateral solutions, and we fought Camp David and the al-Sadat-Israeli treaty. We also fought the Reagan Plan and the Phalangist-American-Israeli agreement. On the contrary, we support the position which is very clearly expressed in the AL-SAFIR interview.

Question After the meeting of the executive committee in Tunis, a special committee was recently formed to follow up on the conflicts. Do you think it will succeed?

/Answer/ We hope so, and we are with the Palestinian solution to the Fatah crisis, which rests on the basis of unity and democratic reform, in order to prepare the way for the application of the phased organizational program which deals with the issues of democratic reform of the PLO's institutions, especially the insuring of collective leadership, the collective nature of decisionmaking, and the independence of the decisionmaking process.

We Are Working To Avoid The Blocked Road

/Question/ At the moment, things have come to a blocked road. What, in your opinion, are the possibilities and effects that this situation could lead to on the leve of the future of the Palestinian struggle?

/Answer/ We are hoping and struggling so that this will not happen. If it does, though, then at that time all the negative possibilities will be open, along with great losses which would affect the cause of our people and revolution, as well as all the achievements which our people have built with blood, sweat, tears, and pain under the occupation in our country and the occupied Lebanese territory. The tears of Sabra and Shatilla and of the camps in southern Lebanon, as well as the cries of our people's demonstrations in the occupied territories cry out for a solution to the crisis via democratic dialogue and a stop to the fighting.

We Will Continue the Struggle to Protect the Unity of the Revolution

/Question/ Some talk of an attempt to change the structure of the PLO and some of its symbols. What do you think about that?

/Answer/ That sort of thing is said a lot these days in announcements and statements. We in the joint political military leadership of the Popular and Democratic Fronts have announced to our people that we will continue the struggle to protect the unity of the PLO on the basis of the phased political program and the decisions of the National Council by democratic methods, while carrying in our hands the organizational program adopted unanimously by the National Assembly in its January 1979 session. This program confirms the maintenance of democracy in the internal relations between the factions of the revolution, as well as the reconstruction of the PLO's institutions on nationalist, confrontationalist bases, from the bottom of the organization to the top. This will insure collective leadership, the democratic nature of decisionmaking, and the independence of the decisionmaking process from all forms of tutelage and Arab reactionary rightist containment.

12224
CSO: 4404/491

SYRIA

DAMASCUS COMMENTARY RAPS U.S. MIDEAST POLICY

JN121400 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 1115 GMT 12 Aug 83

[Station Commentary]

[Text] The crisis which faces U.S. diplomacy in the Arab region, with its problems and conflicts, is not one of diplomatic envoys or their efficiency; it is, precisely, a crisis of U.S. diplomacy itself which is based on stands that are intentionally hostile to the Arab nation's issues and legitimate rights.

Perhaps the U.S. administration still recalls how and where the initiative of former U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers and the mission of his assistance Joseph Sisco ended and how the Arab nation did not keep silent on the Israeli occupation of the Arab territory and on the U.S. support for Israel's aggressive policy. The Arab nation waged the liberation war of October, and its sons wrote with their blood in mortal pages of its glorious militant history.

The frequent failure of the U.S. policy, the armed conflicts, and the wars are due to the absolute bias of the U.S. toward Israel, and the unlimited U.S. enmity toward the Arabs. The Reagan administration in particular, is the most hostile U.S. administration. President Reagan is the one who declared that Israel is the strategic ally of the United States and that guaranteeing its interests definitely promotes U.S. interests. Former U.S. Secretary of State General Alexander Haig is the one who said that guaranteeing Israel's security is the crucial factor of the U.S. policy in the Middle East. This policy has not changed. It is still based on the same principles and rules. Therefore it would not be a surprise if the U.S. said one day that envoy Robert McFarlane was no luckier in his mission than his predecessor Habib.

It seems that the U.S. administration itself is convinced of the inevitability of the failure of the mission of its new envoy if it continues its current policy. What proves this conviction is the feverish attempts by official and non-official quarters in the United States to hold Syria responsible for the continuation of the current situation in Lebanon, although the responsibility falls on the U.S.-Israeli alliance policy which led to the Israeli invasion of this Arab country.

Syria has always demanded the implementation of the UN resolutions--425 for the year 1978; 508, and 509 for the year 1982--to liberate fraternal Lebanon from the Zionist invasion. However, the United States has created for itself and its Zionist ally a new legitimacy in place of the international legitimacy. The U.S. did this when it exploited the invasion to achieve two objectives: First, the entrenchment of the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon through the so-called redeployment of the Israeli forces, and second, the achievement of a U.S. military presence with strategic objectives on the Lebanese territory in accordance with the successive memoranda of understanding concerning the strategic alliance between the United States and Israel.

Hence, the attempts to hold Syria responsible for the continuation of the present situation in Lebanon reflect the failure of the U.S. policy in handling the essential issues on an impartial basis.

No doubt, these attempts will face utter failure, because the U.S. policy has become a symbol for all types of enmity toward the Arab nation. Lebanon, of course, is not an exception to this policy. On the contrary, what is taking place in Lebanon clearly embodies the most prominent signs of U.S. enmity toward our nation, causes, and rights.

CSO: 4400/468

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

AL-BAYAN COMMENTS ON MCFARLANE MISSION

GF150845 Abu Dhabi WAM in Arabic 0805 GMT 15 Aug 83

[From the press review]

[Excerpts] Dubayy, 15 Aug (WAM)--The UAE paper AL-BAYAN has emphasized that only the U.S. Government can make the mission of its envoy McFarlane successful if it seriously and firmly links "the sophisticated weapons and the generous financial and economic aid it provides to Israel with the withdrawal from Lebanon and from the all occupied Arab territories."

The paper stresses that Israel would neither expand nor cling to every inch it occupies from the Arab territories without U.S. support. The paper adds that the United States is well aware of this.

Concluding, the paper stresses belief that the prospects for stability in the region will be totally wiped out if the United States does not seriously force Israel to withdraw from Lebanon and from all the occupied territories. The paper adds that McFarlane will consequently continue to move in a vicious circle and the United States will be responsible for the new developments in this sensitive area of the world.

CSO: 4400/468

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

UAE PAPER ON U.S. PROMOTING PALESTINIAN IMMIGRATION

GF130758 Abu Dhabi WAM in Arabic 0630 GMT 13 Aug 83

[Excerpts] Abu Dhabi, 13 Aug (WAM)--The newspapers AL-ITTIHAD and AL-KHALIJ today expressed concern over the U.S.-Zionist plot aimed at sending Palestinians from Lebanon to the United States, and described it as a real tragedy against which caution and care should be taken in order to foil it.

In its editorial today, the newspaper AL-ITTIHAD said: In spite of the fact that this new tragedy which the United States announced has not been carried out, it reveals Zionism's goal of scattering the Palestinians and quietly removing them from their present communities in order to bring the remnants of Jewish immigrants from all over the world to set them up in Palestine.

AL-ITTIHAD asserted that ameliorating the Palestinians' conditions can only be in one way: recognizing their rights for a state, repatriation, and return of their homeland. Those who are thinking of driving the Palestinians far from their homeland have to consider a more practical way which is to stop the Zionist immigrants who are setting up settlements and whom the U.S. secretary of state does not hesitate to claim have the right to stay in them wherever they might be.

Concluding, the newspaper called on the Arabs and the Palestinians "not to remain between the anvil and the hammer, between the settlements on one side and the attempts at enforced immigration on the other."

The newspaper AL-KHALIJ, published in Ash-Shariqah, expressed the conviction that leaking the report on Palestinian immigration from Lebanon to the United States is no more than a "trial balloon by the United States to sound out the reaction of those concerned with the Arab-Zionist conflict, particularly the Arabs, because the Israelis have adopted the idea of populating the Palestinians in lands which are not theirs."

AL-KHALIJ said: Although the report was leaked and the U.S. secretary of state confirmed that a study is being made on this issue, yet no Arab reaction has been cited "an usually silence is counted as a reaction and is considered as approval of the idea."

The newspaper warned that the U.S. projection of the idea of immigration these days hides many things on the long term: One of which is the U.S.-Israeli plot of considering other Arab regions as an alternative homeland for the Palestinian people, thus forcing the Arabs to find a way out of the quandry the Zionists are in.

Concluding AL-KHALIJ called on the Arabs to reiterate their firm stand that the Palestinian cause is not only a humanitarian issue but an issue of a people who are seeking their rights and the cause of a nation which does not relinquish its rights. This reiteration must not be masked, it should be implemented by taking firm action which all will understand and will not require repeating.

CSO: 4400/468

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

BRIEFS

OFFICIAL LEAVES FOR MOSCOW--Brother Muhammad 'Awad, deputy minister of installations, left Aden for Moscow this morning on a visit to the friendly Soviet Union that will last for a few days. During this visit he will hold talks with comrade Soviet officials on the progress of work at the hydroelectric station project, which is being implemented in our country in cooperation with the friendly Soviet Union. The cost of the hydroelectric station project and the desalination water complex is (al-Kuswah) is approximately 25 million dinars. It is being financed by the friendly Soviet Union within the economic and technical agreement signed between the two countries. [Excerpt] [GF101420 Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1630 GMT 9 Aug 83 GF]

CSO: 4400/467

AFGHANISTAN

JOURNALISTS REPORT ON SITUATION IN COUNTRY

Paris LE MATIN in French 5 Jul 83 pp 10-11

[Article by Philippe Flandrin: "Afghanistan: The War at Point-Blank Range.
1. The Great Departure of the Mujahidin"]

[Text] Hopes for a negotiated settlement of the Afghan crisis, spawned this spring by the efforts of the UN secretary-general, appear to be fading again. G. Shultz, U.S. secretary of state, was in Peshawar the day before yesterday, visiting Afghan refugees. He encouraged Pakistani officials to remain firm on their demand that Soviet troops withdraw from Afghanistan. Kabul authorities were simultaneously launching a campaign against the leaders of the Islamic rebellion, accusing them of living "in royal luxury." The situation will become apparent after reading the 3-part report whose publication we are starting today. Because its authors already had experienced Afghanistan themselves, they were able to go further than previous reports on the Islamic resistance.

Peshawar: North-West Frontier Province, Pakistan--Even in the morning, the Kabul Bazaar is thick with people. In the noise and racket, news is passed on by word of mouth. The dollar's exchange rate is 13.50 rupees; it has skyrocketed. The police have seized 5 tons of pure heroin, breaking a record. On the border with Afghanistan, the conflict between shi'ites and sunnites has flared up again. Moscow and the mujahidin are involved. This is only the beginning.

Since the diplomats have been talking about peace in Geneva, the climate has deteriorated in Peshawar. The city is the scene of scores being settled violently. Soldiers patrol the streets and have stepped up surveillance.

The Afghan mujahidin face new harassment from the Pakistani Government every day. In April, stuffy officials told them that their newspapers would be censored in the future. In May, Abdurahman Paswak, a political figure of the resistance, was placed under house arrest for having publicly repudiated the Geneva negotiations.

He has been silenced, but not "Redbeard," the mullah Yunus Khales, who stated following an interview with the Pakistani foreign affairs minister that he

would return to Afghanistan to protect the independence of his party, Hezb-e Eslami. His alter ego, Professor Rabani, leader of Jamiat Ilhami, could not be prevented from agreeing with him.

For the first time since the start of the Afghan diaspora in Pakistan, there is doubt about refugees returning to Afghanistan. Thousands of fighters have now left without any idea of returning and for those mujahidin, the road is long. It starts a stone's throw from the Kabuli Bazaar at the bus station, on the Peshawar-Parachinar line.

Chinese Weapons for Fighters

If Peshawar is the political capital of the mujahidin, then the little town of Parachinar is definitely their ammunition depot. It is here, barely 10 km inside Pakistan, that their weapons depots and barracks are located.

Since this winter, under the very noses of the Soviets, whose first posts were set up along the border, thousands of Chinese-made weapons have been arriving in Parachinar for distribution to rebel fighters before they leave on their jihad.

Major Janat Gul, of Mohaz e Melli (monarchist), is satisfied. He estimates: With the Chinese arms, I can equip two-thirds of my men with Kalashnikov rifles. Each group of 15 men will have an antitank RPG [rocket propelled grenade]. Companies will have heavy machine guns (Dashaka) against helicopters. Munitions are plentiful. So with men 300 by 300, we're going to be able to hit very hard.

And the discipline will be tough, too. Five years ago, Janat Gul came down from the mountains yelling the war cries of Pashtoon fighters. There was firing in all directions, everyone did as he pleased after getting through the front lines. Losses were enormous.

Today, things are different. In the neighboring camp, Major Haji Mohammad of Hezb-e Eslami (Khales) is glad when he sees his men standing stiffly at attention. An Afghan army is in the process of being born.

It is a heterogeneous army: there are now countless parties and fronts, but in the camps of Janat Gul and Haji Mohammad, the discipline and hierarchy are identical. Each commands a 1,000-man front with the same noncom, a sar-group, heading each group of 20 men. The sar-group is the kingpin of the Afghan resistance. He is quite young, 20 or 25 years old. He knows how to read, write and is familiar with the weapons. He marches, lives and dies with his men. Signs of respect are reduced to a minimum. Respect is owed only to God.

In this spring of 1983, the same actions are being repeated in every resistance camp: ripping open crates, cleaning the grease-covered weapons. Disassembly, reassembly.

Shi'ites Against Sunnites

The troops were scheduled to move out the next day and Haji Mohammad had allowed his men to go do some shopping at the bazaar. But the first ones returned after barely a half-hour with bad news. A nasty affair--3,000 armed fighters occupied the bazaar and they were not Afghans, but Pakistani shi'ites from the Touri tribe.

Maybe the weapons would be used sooner than expected. With a yell, Haji Mohammad called together his troops and aimed his artillery at the bazaar. This was on 19 April 1983. The Afghanistan war had spread to Pakistan.

Janat Gul did the opposite of Haji Mohammad. His weapons remained in a neat orderly line. A confrontation between Afghans and Pakistanis at Parachinar, in Pakistan, could only be the work of the Soviets.

This is because the Touris are shi'ites. For 20 years, the tribe has had strained relations with the Mengal tribe, who are sunnites. There have always been risks. What complicates matters is the fact that these Touri shi'ites have become a minority since the influx of Afghan refugees, most of whom are sunnites.

So for 3 years, the Touris have been very scared. Having been alerted to this fact, agents from Kabul went to see them, to offer them arms. The conflict has been underway in Parachinar for 1 year. Three days ago, the Touris killed eight Afghans and now Haji Mohammad was aiming a mortar rocket launcher and two Dashakas at the bazaar. In the midst of this panic, the Pakistani government representative remained on the phone and negotiations were started between the Touri chiefs and Afghan leaders.

Janat Gul heard gunfire ring out 200 meters from his command post. A crowd had formed a circle around an old man stretched out on the ground, his body covered with blood. The people said that he would soon die.

"What happened?"

"Nothing. We found this shi'ite roaming around and we killed him. If you see any others, let us know. We want to avenge the eight men assassinated yesterday."

In this climate of pogrom, the course of diplomacy is littered with a thousand obstacles. Finally, an agreement was signed in the evening. The Touris, who were blocking the road, let the mujahidin pass on their way to Afghanistan. Haji Mohammad withdrew his guns and his men reached the border under the protection of the Pakistani Army. Nearly 1,000 men, belonging to the six major resistance parties, made up the convoy. Parachinar breathed easier and the great Afghan trek continued.

This great trek, this endless procession of armed men and caravans of camels and horses on their way to parts of Afghanistan, is the annual migration of the Afghan people when the snows melt. Those who stayed in the country,

in spite of the terrible winter, received food, arms and news of their brothers who had left for Pakistan. This year, it was also the migration of the two most powerful resistance organizations, Jamiat Ilhami and Hezb-e Eslami, whose apparatus and officials returned to the country to step up the fight against the invader.

Haji Mohammad left for Kabul with a 170-man unit. In the front, there were 20 good young well-armed marchers with 4 RPG 7's in the event of a skirmish with tanks. In the rear, there were mules loaded with munitions and 15 men under the command of the boudar, a sar-group grown gray from 4 years of war. And since Haji Mohammad knew the boudar well, he placed the rear guard under the supervision of a ma'alim, a former teacher acting as the column's government representative.

The ma'alim with his political ideas and his doctrines: the boudar didn't like him very much and just to annoy him, he asked him, just when they were pulling out, to roll him a cigarette with very dark good hashish.

But the ma'alim said nothing. The jihad came first. They went through dead villages, uninhabited landscapes. They crossed rivers next to destroyed bridges and went through mountain passes along goat paths. In the end, they were so weary they had forgotten why. Then they hated the night because of the darkness. But when they marched during the day, helicopters harassed them and they also hated the daylight.

Ikram's Execution

On the morning of the third day, they came upon the Lowgar River, which flows down to Kabul. But at the foot of the slope, the small village of Dobandin, where they had planned to stop, had just been razed.

Nothing to drink, nothing to eat. They had to march. Despite his bad knee, which caused him to limp, the ma'alim began to laugh and then suddenly they saw Ikram coming. He was running like a kid, despite his heavy military greatcoat. The ma'alim immediately stopped him.

In the devastated village, they found only the dwelling of a former trafficker as a refuge, enough to satisfy the cravings of the boudar. Ikram first said he was a deserter. He said he wanted to join the mujahidin to fight the Soviets, who had drafted him one day while he was plowing. The boudar invited him to share the men's food. He ate poorly and after the meal, the ma'alim took him away to question him.

Then Ikram changed his story. No, he wasn't a deserter. His commander had sent him on a mission. He was to check out the results of the bombing of Dobandin and find out the routes of the mujahidin. The boudar lit his cigarette butt again. They took out official party stationery and the boudar took down Ikram's statements. In the sky there was a leaden sun and those damned helicopters were flying around like big insects.

Ikram wasn't even 20 years old. He signed the statement by putting his thumb print on it. Then everyone went to sleep while waiting for Haji Mohammad. The commander was camping about 10 kilometers away. When he arrived, his beard gray with dust, the ma'alim demanded that this spy be put to death and the boudar said they couldn't take the risk of taking Ikram along.

So Ikram went into the mountains, where three men executed him. The boudar lit his cigarette and the ma'alim went to pray.



A Month of Reporting

This report is the result of a friendship between three journalists: Coskun Aral, a 27-year-old Turkish national, Reza Deghati, a 30-year-old Iranian, and Philippe Flandrin, a 35-year-old Frenchman. After leaving Peshawar, they each set off in a different direction. Aral went to the Panshir to meet Massoud and the Panshirists. Reza went to east Kabul with Mahaze Melli's monarchists. Flandrin went to west Kabul with the Islamists of Hezb-e Islami of Yunus Khales and Abdul Haq. Field research was supplemented with investigations conducted in Peshawar, Islamabad and tribal areas where Afghan refugees live.

PAPER INTERVIEWS AWAMI LEAGUE-H GENERAL SECRETARY

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 20 Jul 83 pp 1, 8

[Text] Mr. Abdur Razzak General Secretary of Bangladesh Awami League (Hasina) favoured holding of a special council session of the party to settle differences of opinion in the organisation he told this to The Bangladesh Observer when asked to comment on the resolution adopted in the meeting of the Presidium on Monday.

The Presidium of the Awami League (Hasina) in a resolution adopted at its meeting on Monday condemned a section of party leaders for their "misleading utterances" and urged them to refrain from issuing such statements or making such remarks. The presidium decided to refer the matter to extended meeting of the working committee to be held on July 31 and August 1 for final decision.

The party faction led by General Secretary Mr. Razzak is likely to go for a counteraction through a statement by four members of the Presidium.

It is further learnt that Mr. Abdul Malek Ukil and Mr. Abdur Razzak will address a Eid Reunion meeting of party workers at Jessore today (Wednesday) in the afternoon. The meeting will be attended by party workers from Jessore Kushtia Meherpur Chuadanga Narail, Magura and Jhenidah organisational districts, according to a source close to the faction.

Criticizing the remarks made by a section of the party leaders the resolution of the party Presidium said that some of the leading members of the party were active in creating confusion in the party through utterances and statements. They did not even hesitate to make some motivated remarks on the decision of the party Working Committee meeting on June 12. The resolution further said that these acts and utterances by those quarters were nothing but attempts to create chaos and disorder in the party and it is against the party discipline.

However Mr Razzak told this correspondent on Tuesday that he was not aware of any such resolution of the Presidium. No such resolution was adopted at the meeting of the Presidium on Monday. He alleged that for over a year lots of agendas were not disposed of in the Working Committee meetings. He further alleged that a section of party leaders were issuing news to media without the knowledge of the party in an attempt to hasten the split of the party and

mislead the workers. These allegation and counter-allegation was the result of criticising four members of the Presidium for their remarks at Chittagong at the Presidium on Monday. The Presidium meeting was attended by ten out of 11 members of the Presidium including Mr. Mohiuddin Ahmed Mr. Abdul Momen Talukdar and Mr. Abdur Razzak. All the three leaders left the meeting before conclusion. The resolution was drafted at the residence of Mr. Korban Ali on Tuesday and was approved by Presidium members at lunch these Party chief Sheikh Hasina and Mr Abdul Mannan was also present at the lunch.

Meanwhile, party faction led by Mr. Razzak met at the residence of Mr. Malek Ukil on Tuesday to discuss their future of action. This faction is learnt to have decided to go for a counter action.

The resolution of the Presidium was released under the signature of Mr. Mohammad Nasim, Youth Secretary of the party.

However, Mr. Abdur Razzak along with Mr. Abdul Mannan attended the meeting of 15-party Alliance held on Tuesday.

Syed Ahmed, Office Secretary, Bangladesh Awami League (Hasina) in a statement on Tuesday castigated Mr. Tofayel Aymed, Organising Secretary of the party for the observations he made to a national news agency.

Syed Ahmed said that Mr. Tofayel Ahmed has no constitutional right to make such statement. He said that the party constitution empowers the party President, party General Secretary and any other member of the Presidium to make any statement and such statements should be distributed under the signature of the Office Secretary.

CSO: 4600/1447

REPORTER DISCUSSES DISSENSION IN AWAMI LEAGUE

Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 20 Jul 83 pp 1, 8

[Article by Hasan Saoed]

[Text] Sectism in the Awami League is now almost complete and according to all indications available in the city the party may undergo yet another split early next month.

The working committee of the party which is scheduled to meet in the capital on July 31 and August 1 is expected to review what a senior party leader told New Nation "mess inside the party" and take "drastic measures" to weed out the undesirable elements.

Although the leader would not mention the names of the likely "undesirable elements" inside the party, however, gave broad hints that the group led by presidium members Abdul Malek Ukil, Abdul Momin Talukdar, Mohiuddin Ahmed and organisational general secretary Abdur Razzaque was almost certain to be axed out of the party.

The party's Presidium which met in Dhaka on Monday took serious view of the frontal attacks made by Malek Ukil, Abdul Momin Talukdar and Abdur Razzaque on the top party leadership in Chittagong a day earlier. Malek Ukil was conspicuous by his absence in meeting, which resolved to take "drastic actions" against the militant group and also decided to hold working committee meeting in a hurry to clear the party out of what yet another Awami League leader said "trouble makers" in the organisation.

Party insiders told New Nation that Abdur Razzak and his senior party colleagues united with him were fully aware of the probable actions against them. They have already rented a house close to the residence of Abdur Razzak for setting up their party office once they were ousted from the Awami League.

Razzak group in the meantime has been maintaining a meaningful distance from the other group and expect for attending the party meetings, they were not even visiting the party office regularly as in the past.

The party presidium is divided into two groups. The major one comprising seven members is led by party chief Hasina Wajid and Dr Kamal Hossain. The other fours are led by Abdur Razzak and Abdul Malek Ukil. The 12-member presidium was reduced to 11 when Phani Bhushan Majumdar died and the vacancy caused was not filled in. Presidium takes decision on the basis of majority votes.

The heir breadth crack in the party which developed soon after the political parties were allowed to function in 1978 made a minor dent when party's senior leader Mizanur Rahman Choudhury and some others close to his thinking on the concept of Baksalism opted out of the party.

The party faced yet another serious crisis in 1981 when it was threatened with major split:

Hasina Wajid living in self exile in India was, however, chosen as a compromise candidate to stop the split in the organisation.

The present crisis was accelerated over the issue of recognition of Chhatra League, the student front of the organisation, which was split into two groups. The presidium recently recognised the Chhatra League which had the support of the party chief Hasina Wajid.

A middle ranking leader of the Razzaque group told New Nation last night that they did not believe in the split in the party. He, however, hastened to add that if they were forced to part ways "We will have no regrets." Something like this was in the offing for quite some time past. The earlier the better, he concluded.

Party Chief Hasina Wajid is believed to have indicated to some of the senior party colleagues that she was opposed to the idea of split in the party but would not oppose it if the working committee finally decided in favour of it.

A party insider told New Nation that the impression of some of the active members of the party that Razzaque group was forcing the party to take premature political decisions which ultimately would favour the government was one of the main reasons for the "party bosses" to give up idea of patching up with Razzaque group.

DEMOCRATIC LEAGUE DEMANDS POLL BY 1984

Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 24 Jul 83 pp 1, 8

[Text] The Democratic League (Mushtaq) yesterday demanded presidential and parliamentary elections by March 1984 restoring the suspended constitution.

This came as a resolution adopted at a party central committee meeting with the party chief Khandakar Mushtaq Ahmed in the chair.

The meeting also expressed delay in holding the elections would make the present situation of the country more complex. On constitutional questions the DL Central Committee observed that there might be differences of opinion over the constitution but only an elected Parliament could solve those issues. Any attempt to amend the constitution by any individual would intensify the crisis.

The DL Central Committee observed that the political vacuum that would persist till the national elections in March, 1985 as proposed by the government would result in debilitating economy and strengthening the forces of aggression.

The meet also expressed concern over Dahagram, Angarpota, Tinbigha situation sharing of Ganges waters and the formation of a joint economic commission with India.

The D.L central committee also demanded immediate lifting of ban on open politics.

The meeting also expressed its grave concern at the interim water sharing agreement between India and Bangladesh on Teesta waters by passing the demand for a permanent solution.

CSO: 4600/1449

BANGLADESH

MUJIB'S YOUNGEST DAUGHTER VISITS CHITTAGONG

Visit 'Nonpolitical'

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 22 Jul 83 pp 1, 12

[Text] Chittagong, July 21:--Sheikh Rehana youngest daughter of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman arrived here today on a three-day visit to Chittagong.

Sheikh Rehana accompanied by her husband Mr. Shafiq Siddique and a son reached here by train this morning. League workers and some district level AL leaders received them at the station.

Sheikh Rehana with her husband and son will stay at the residence of her brother-in-law Mr Rafiq Siddique at Nasirabad.

The Chittagong North and South District Awami League will jointly hold a "post-marriage reception" for Sheikh Rehana and her husband.

Sheikh Rehana has come to visit Cittagong following the postponement of the visit of her sister Awami League Chief Sheikh Hasina. But the Awami League circle here termed her as "non-political and private". However Awami League led by Mr. Shirajul Haq Mia and Mr. Abdulla-al-Harun conspicuously stayed away from the programmes of Sheikh Rehana in Chittagong.

Report on Reception Speech

Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 24 Jul 83 pp 1, 8

[Text] July 23: Sheikh Rehana today demanded punishment for the killers of her father and called upon the Awami League Workers to press the Government to try the killers of Bangabandhu.

She was speaking at a reception given in her honour and her husband here today.

Held at the Chittagong Rifle Club the reception was addressed, among others, by Mr. Akhtaruzzaman Babu and Mr. Abdul Wahab, AL president of Chittagong North and South respectively.

Speakers at the reception expressed their renewed support for the leadership of Sheikh Hasina Wajed.

Mr. Shafiq Siddique, Sheikh Rehana's husband, in his brief speech called upon the Awami League workers to remain united and fight for the restoration of four state principles and Bangalee nationalism as enunciated by Bangabandhu.

CSO: 4600/1449

TEXT OF ERSHAD SPEECH AT BANQUET IN MALDIVES

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 28 Jul 83 p 3

[Text] Following is the text of Lt. Gen. H. M. Ershad CMLA speech delivered at the banquet given in his honour by Mr. Maumoon Abdul Gayoom President of the Republic of Maldives on Tuesday:--

Your Excellency

Mr. Maumoon Abdul Gayoom

President of Maldives

Excellencies

Distinguished Guests.

I am indeed very happy and honoured to be able to visit Maldives at the kind invitation of Your Excellency and to have the opportunity of meeting you once again Mr President. I am so pleased to be among brothers and dear friends. Your country is well-known for its scenic beauty and traditional hospitality. The warmth of reception the lavish hospitality and the many courtesies extended to me and the members of my delegation have truly overwhelmed us. May I also thank you for the very kind sentiments that you have expressed about my country and about me personally.

Excellency we recall with great satisfaction your memorable visit to our country in March this year. Your visit contributed greatly to the development of better understanding and cooperation and deepening of the bonds of friendship between our two brotherly countries. I have come to Maldives bringing with me the warm greetings and best wishes of the people of Bangladesh for the fraternal people of Maldives.

Excellency,

It is a matter of great satisfaction that relations between our two countries have been growing steadily. Our two countries are bound together by common religion geography history and culture. We have common commitments ties and shared objectives. In the comity of Nations. Both our countries are committed

to the principles of Non-alignment. We are fellow members of the Organisation of Islamic Conference the United Nations as well as the Commonwealth. Over the years our consultations and discussion have brought us together towards concerted approaches to world problems.

Your Excellency

We have been observing with deep admiration the steady progress that your country is making under your wise and able leadership. The dynamism which you have displayed both in the domestic and external spheres elicits the admiration of all. Your efforts at improving the quality of lives of the people of Maldives are truly commendable. Internationally Maldives' rightful role in world affairs is well recognised.

Bangladesh too is now engaged in the challenging tasks of national upliftment. My Government came to office little over a year ago with a new mission. We have concentrated our energy for the purpose of nation-building. Our commitment is total; and our objective is to derive the maximum economic and social benefits for our people. My administration has already taken a number of steps in this direction. As you had observed during your visit to our country we have launched a programme of decentralisation to take the administration to rural Bangladesh with a view to ensuring the common people's participation in the administration and development activities. The Thana has been made the focal point and the basic unit and is being strengthened to provide services to the people nearer to their homes. The judiciary has also been decentralised with a view to making justice speedily available to the people. At the same time we are making relentless efforts for the attainment of our cherished goal of economic self-reliance and raising the quality of lives of our people. My government's plan for people's participation at all levels is already being implemented. Elections on the basis of adult franchise will be held at local levels this winter and at the national level in March 1985.

Your Excellency

We are deeply concerned about mounting escalation of tension threatening world peace and security. Israel's naked aggression against our Arab Brethren is a grave threat to peace. We believe that an enduring peace in West Asia can be achieved only on the basis of Israel's total and unconditional withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories including the Holy City of Jerusalem, realisation of the legitimate and inalienable rights of the Palestinian people including their right to have an independent state in their own homeland under the leadership of the PLO, their sole and legitimate representative and restoration of Al-Quds Al-Sharif to Islamic and Arab sovereignty. The Lebanese people must have the right to full sovereignty without outside interference.

The fratricidal war between brotherly Islamic countries, Iran and Iraq, is a severe blow to Islamic Ummah. We appeal to both the brotherly countries for an immediate cessation of hostilities, and for a just and honourable solution of the disputes between them. On our party, we are prepared to extend whatever assistance that may be required to bring this conflict to an end.

The situations in Afghanistan and Kampuchea threaten our region, Foreign troops must be immediately and unconditionally withdrawn so as to enable the peoples of the two countries to determine their own destiny free from any external interference and intervention.

Bangladesh condemns imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism racialism apartheid and domination in any form. We reiterate our support to the heroic people of South Africa and Namibia in their just struggle for freedom and justice.

In our region we have been concerned about mounting Great Power rivalry in the Indian Ocean. Bangladesh and Maldives have consistently supported the UN resolution on Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. It is our earnest hope that all countries will soon agree to the holding of the proposed International Conference on the Indian Ocean in Colombo at a very early date.

EXCELLENCY

Both Bangladesh and Maldives are Least Developed Countries but our efforts in ameliorating the welfare of our peoples are being impeded by unfavourable international economic environment and the inequitable global economic structure. It should be recognised that the world today has become an interdependent economic unit. We all depend for our livelihood and development on a settled international economic order and a prosperous world economy. But a shadow hangs over the development efforts of our countries. Ordinary men and women will be denied justice their aspirations will remain unfulfilled and human dignity will not flower unless the poverty and development gap is narrowed.

While we wait for the developed countries to come forward and cooperate with us we must take new initiatives towards South-South and regional cooperation. The recent results of UNCTAD-VI further confirms that we must do so as early as possible through mutual consultation if necessary at the highest level.

With our common commitment to peace and progress our two countries can together strive to make a better world for us. Our own region of South Asia is one in which we desire closer ties and greater cooperation to our mutual benefit. Together we may help to bring in a new era of cooperation in our region. Your Excellency's personal interest and initiatives to make South Asian cooperation a reality is indeed welcome to all. We are happy that our combined efforts are at least bearing fruit and are generating a momentum for realisation of structured regional cooperation. We trust that the forthcoming meeting of the Foreign Ministers in New Delhi will be a success and will formally launch the programme for regional cooperation.

YOUR EXCELLENCY

The people of Bangladesh greatly value their friendship with the brotherly and fraternal people of Maldives. I am honoured to visit your country and am greatly pleased to be able to participate in your National Day Celebrations.

The warmth of my reception and the feelings of friendship towards Bangladesh manifested everywhere is a clear indication that our bonds of friendship and cooperation will be ever-lasting. I thank Your Excellency once again for all that you have done for us during this visit and I would look forward to meeting you again soon in Bangladesh.

Excellencies and Distinguished Guests may I now request you to join me in a toast:

--to the good health long-life and happiness of His Excellency President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom.

--to the continued peace progress and prosperity of the brotherly people of Maldives.

--to the ever-lasting friendship and cooperation between Bangladesh and Maldives.

CSO: 4600/1444

DETAILS OF CURRENT AGRICULTURAL LOAN TOLD

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH TIMES in English 29 Jul 83 p 1

[Text] Paridpur, July 28: Labour and Manpower Minister Air Vice-Marshal (Retd) Aminul Islam said here today the Government has decided to extend more than Taka 800 crore as agricultural loan in the current financial year to meet food shortage by increasing agricultural production, reports BSS.

Addressing a cross-section of people at the Kabi Jasimuddin Hall in the morning, the Minister said at present the Government has to import food-grains worth more than 1000 crore taka annually for meeting the deficit.

The Labour Minister informed the audience of the Government decision to complete the Khaka-Bhanga section of the Dhaka-Khulna Asian Highway. The decision fulfilled a long felt demand of the people of western part of the country and reduce the Dhaka-Khulna distance significantly.

Explaining various programmes of the present government, the Air Vice-Marshal said improvements took place in almost all spheres of the national life since the Martial Law government assumed the responsibility of the state-craft.

Pointing to the 18-point programme of the present Government, the Minister said it was designed after careful assessment of the problems of the country. He urged the people from all walks of life to come forward with helping hands for the effective implementation of the programmes for the overall development of the nation within shortest possible time.

The Labour and Manpower Minister also visited a number of self-employed projects in the district and while talking to the self-employed youths he urged them to inspire more youths in similar prospects.

He said over one crore people are employed in the country and government alone cannot provide them with employment. But the government, he said, has been generating employment opportunities through various development programmes in the rural areas.

CSO: 4600/1446

BANGLADESH

BRIEFS

NEW GDR AMBASSADOR--The new Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic to Bangladesh, Mr. Lothar Nestler, presented his credentials to President Mr. Justice Ahsanuddin Chowdhury at Bangabhaban in Dhaka on Tuesday morning, reports BSS. After presenting his credentials the envoy referred to the relationship of mutual understanding and cooperation between his country and Bangladesh and said that he would strive his best to promote further the existing relationship to the mutual benefit of both the countries. The President reciprocated the sentiments expressed by the envoy and assured him of all possible assistance and cooperation in the discharge of his duties and responsibilities during his term of stay in Bangladesh. He expressed his appreciation of the progress achieved by the German Democratic Republic in the development of their national economy. Earlier, on arrival at the Bangabhaban the envoy took the salute presented by the smartly turned-out contingent of the President's Guard Regiment. [Text] [Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 20 Jul 83 pp 1, 8]

AMBASSADOR TO PDRY--The government has decided to concurrently accredit Mr. Mohammed Nohsin, at present Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, as Ambassador to Democratic Republic of Yemen, reports BSS. [Text] [Dhaka THE BANGLADESH TIMES in English 28 Jul 83 p 3]

COLOMBO VISIT POSTPONED--Male, July 26:--The Governments of Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have mutually agreed to postpone the visit of the Chief Martial Law Administrator Lt. Gen. H. M. Ershad to Sri Lanka to a convenient date later this year in view of the prevailing situation in Colombo, a Bangladesh Foreign Office spokesman said here today reports BSS. The CMLA, according to the spokesman has agreed to extend his current visit to Maldives by one day at the request of the Maldivian President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom. General Ershad will now leave Male for Dhaka on July 29 on conclusion of the visit. [Text] [Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 27 Jul 83 p 1]

CSO: 4600/1447

PAKISTAN

PRESIDENT'S PROMISES OF ELECTIONS, RETURN OF DEMOCRACY RIDICULED

Lahore CHATAN in Urdu 27 Jun-4 Jul 83 p 5

[Text] We should clearly acknowledge the fact that had the 1977 situation not been controlled in time, the country would have been engulfed in a staggering tragedy. By imposing martial law on the country on the night of 5 July 1977, Mohammad Zia Haq undoubtedly did the nation a great service. The situation then was such that it could only have gotten worse. On assuming authority, the worthy president promised that his rule would last only 90 days and during this period he would normalize the situation and in accordance with the basic conventions of democracy, he would leave after handing over power to the elected representatives of the people. This promise turned out to be as flimsy in reality as it was attractive and beautiful to the mind, and it broke down even before 90 days had passed. After about a year, General Zia once again turned toward democracy and in 1978 dallied with the idea of provincial elections. This was a ray of hope that brightened the darkness of martial law. Electioneering started. But only a couple of days before the elections, the president's mood underwent another change and the promise of elections broke into pieces like the fragile thing it was.

Just as throughout his rule the president has made many promises of elections, so has he used various experiments to prolong his rule. Once he even permitted a civilian to share power. However, some people did not prove to be comfortable fellow-travellers and were therefore dismissed. Creation of advisory councils and provincial councils are some of the president's devices. Undaunted by his record, he continues to scatter the largest of his faded and tired promises.

The president has no desire for power. He knows that supreme authority is only another name for popular rule and without restoring democracy no progress can be made in this direction.

But in spite of this there are no indications or evidence to show that any steps are being taken to restore democracy and popular rule in accordance with Pakistan's ideology. There is only one promise that on the 14th of August a new political structure will be announced.

First, from past experience we have no hope that this promise will be fulfilled. And even if it materializes there is little hope that this political

structure will be a beautiful reflection of the expectations and aspirations of the masses. According to the consensus among the people, the new political structure will contain full provisions for ensuring the continued supremacy of martial law and the suspension and muzzling of the constitution.

Under these conditions, the entire nation is falling prey to serious depression. History is witness that a nation that lives under the shadow of demoralization and hopelessness can never achieve progress or success. Under 6 years of continuous martial law our democratic and political institutions are in ruins. Clearly this is not the kind of achievement of which our history can be proud.

If from these words the honorable president can guess the bitterness of our hearts, then it becomes his primary duty to avoid precipitating any situation that might necessitate the prolongation of the present martial law or the imposition of a new one.

12286
CSO: 4656/229

PAKISTAN

PAKISTAN PEOPLE'S PARTY LEADER ON END OF MARTIAL LAW

GF142038 Karachi DAWN in English 11 Aug 83 p 1

[Text] Leader of defunct Pakistan People's Party, Mr Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, has said if there was anything short of the restoration of 1973 Constitution, lifting of martial law and announcement of general elections in the scheduled speech of Gen Ziaul Haq, people will voice their anger.

In an interview with BBC broadcast Wednesday night, he said that MRD has decided to call for a nationwide movement because it did not expect any breakthrough on the question of restoration of democracy by General Ziaul Haq in his August 14 announcement.

When asked if it meant demonstrations and agitation, Mr Jatoi said "Of course." He said the people tolerated martial law for six years but there is a limit of tolerance. Now that limit is over, he added.

Mr Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi held bureaucracy and generals responsible for failure of democracy in Pakistan.

Mr Jatoi said martial law and Pakistan cannot now live together. He said the country's situation was deteriorating and everyone was worried about the integrity and security of the country.

Mr Jatoi said there is no rift within MRD. He admitted there had been differences among the component parties but there was nothing extra-ordinary about it.

Mr Jatoi said the announcement about LB [Local Bodies] polls and new political structure came simultaneously. It seemed that General Zia was trying to divert people's attention from main issue which, he said, was the restoration of democracy. Mr Jatoi substantiated his assessment by saying that dates of filing nomination papers for LB polls were fixed during July and August, instead of September and October so that people were kept busy in these activities and forgot about restoration of democracy for the time being. Mr Jatoi said "But the government will not achieve success in its plan."

Mr Jatoi said all the parties in MRD trust each other and have decided to free the country from martial law. After the elections they will cooperate with each other to serve the country.

ECONOMIST'S VIEWS CHALLENGING REGIME'S PLANNING STRATEGY DISCUSSED

Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 28 Jul 83 p 8

[Text]

DR. MUBASHAR HASAN is, perhaps, not the first to assail the Planning Commission for its subservience to the dictates of the IMF and the World Bank but he has done his countrymen a good turn by framing the charge cogently and in detail.

In his lecture at the National Press Club, Islamabad, the other day, the former Minister for Finance and Planning avoided going into the details of the Sixth Plan and rightly confined himself to the broad issues of strategy. It stands to reason that if the planners were as helpless to defy the fiat of IMF/World Bank as Dr. Mubashar says they were, and if they had to conform to the formulas imposed on this country in 1980, it would have been impossible to draw up a Plan on the basis of an objective assessment of the people's development needs, their resources, and their vision of future.

Not only Pakistan but every member of the exploited Third World has learnt from experience that IMF/World Bank prescriptions are written not in the national interest of the struggling countries but to the advan-

tage of the rich West. Further, Dr. Mubashar alleges that the Plan admits of no role by the people in their advancement, and that it accords neither with the Islamic professions of the regime nor with the need to alleviate the misery of the downtrodden. While his assumptions appear to be generally sound, it is necessary that the should show precisely how the sixth plan cannot answer the national needs.

REGIONAL COOPERATION

Dr. Mubashar Hasan has stressed the need for greater economic collaboration with India. The argument focuses attention on the Third World countries' need to develop mutually beneficial economic relations among themselves and to promote the concept of regional cooperation. The objective cannot be achieved without reducing reliance on the advanced capitalist countries and at least making IMF/World Bank advice subject to national imperatives. Further, it is necessary to examine afresh, and

thoroughly, the consequences of relinquishing freedom in the choice of economic partners. The division of potential economic collaborators into holy and unholy categories, which Pakistan has followed against saner counsel, has been a major cause of its failure to make satisfactory progress.

While the debate on the Sixth Plan has not even begun, and one hopes all sections of public opinion will shed their lethargy and give earnest consideration to matters which are going to affect their future, Authority must answer the specific issues raised by Dr. Mubashar Hasan. He has thrown a challenge the Planning authorities can evade only at the risk of confirming the accusation. No regime can spurn the plea that planning should be done first and foremost in the national interest. Mere verbal duels would not do; the people demand satisfaction in the form of arguments supported with facts.

CSO: 4600/828

COMMENTARY ON PPP, MRD AFFAIRS

Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 28 Jul 83 p 11

[Text]

The Secretary-General of the defunct PPP, Mr. Farooq Leghari, has laid claims to be the founding father of the MRD. One could never dream of him indulging in such a heinous activity as homicide. Anyway, he being a person most interested in the grassroots which interest me, too, even though for entirely different reasons, his sayings need to be quoted.

The PNA millions

First, he has disclosed that before launching its movement, the PNA had collected Rs. 210 million and he expected the MRD to collect only 2.1 million for their so-called movement. Now, while it is for the PNA leadership of yester-year to state where all that money came from and how was it utilised (apart from what was left with Justice (Retd.) B.Z. Kaikaus, which issue seems to have been mutually settled as we hear or read nothing more on the subject) it is really surprising that the MRD hasn't been able to collect the paltry sum of Rs. 2.1 million – just one per cent of the PNA booty. This is all the more surprising because the amount can be easily subscribed by a dozen of our feudals many of whom identify themselves with one or the other of the MRD components, notably Mr. Leghari's party. Or, is it that the feudals feel that the MRD is no longer good enough to serve their interests? Two of the top PPP feudals, Mr. Leghari and Mr.

Mumtaz Bhutto, have hinted at that in different ways. While Mr. Leghari has referred to his meeting with the Jamaat-i-Islami Secretary-General, Qazi Husain Ahmad, and claimed that his party chairperson, Begum Nusrat Bhutto, had instructed him about cooperating with the Jamaat if it was ready to participate in the so-called civil disobedience movement.

Mr. Mumtaz Bhutto, on the other hand, while referring to the lack of confidence and unity among MRD parties, referred to his proposal to reorganise the defunct PPP instead of making it a part of the MRD. He also regretted that his proposal did not receive the attention it deserved. Furthermore, he said that many MRD parties were part of the PNA that had launched a movement against PPP rule. He also charged them of having pressurised the Government into executing Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. In his view, the main reasons for the MRD's failure were the mutual doubts and suspicions among its component parties. Another cause for the complications and uncertainties in the political arena, according to ZAB's 'talented cousin', was that a large number of politicians had chosen to collaborate with the Government. Again, some had retired from the scene. Even a layman can find that he has made accusations that can only deepen the existing doubts and suspicions instead of reducing them. But he has amply indicated that he was the one who opposed the PPP joining the MRD. The PPP

feudals' interest thus appears to be at variance with those of the other MRD components' diverse interests.

The defunct PPP feudals in the Punjab, led by Mr. Leghari who has known contacts in the bureaucratic echelons of power, however, appear to have decided to accept and consolidate their position by their 'no-compromise' stance vis-a-vis their decision to participate in the local elections for which they are sure of attracting hundreds of thousands ticket-seekers.

However, one doesn't know how Mr. Leghari and his deputy, Gen. (Retd.) Tikka Khan, would react to the firm declaration by the Federal as well as all Provincial Governments that political parties would not be allowed to participate in local elections and those violating this ban would be weeded out.

Simple way

A simple way to beat the ban that comes to pro-grassroots minds is that party nominees should never have been charged, detained or convicted for taking part in political activities. The defunct PPP, of course, has many such gentlemen and ladies at various levels of its vast 'lashkar'. Coming as he does from the tribal Punjab District of D.G. Khan, Mr. Leghari must be sufficiently well-versed in choosing and commanding his part of the 'lashkar'.

PAKISTAN

INDIRECT U.S. MOVE TO SECURE BASES ALLEGED

Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 28 Jul 83 p 34

[Text]

A CANADIAN magazine has recently made the startling revelation that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia would soon by signing a defence treaty under which the two countries will cooperate with each other in matters relating to internal security and the elimination of terrorist organisations. Saudi Arabia has similar arrangements with Morocco, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the United Arab Emirates. The Canadian magazine has linked this proposed treaty directly with the defence of the Gulf countries and indirectly with the American military strategy. . . . Similarly the bases made available to the Gulf States on the Baluchistan coast would in effect be meant for American use. The magazine writes that according to the 1980 Fukiyama Report, Pakistan is vitally located so far as the entry from the east into the Gulf of the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force is concerned. The use of Karachi port can greatly enhance the strike capability of the RDF. According to the magazine, it is on American advice that Saudi Arabia has strengthened its military relations with Pakistan. The statement that the U.S. does not need Pakistani bases is nothing more than a political lie. Therefore, after Pakistan's refusal (to give bases) it is conspiring to indirectly secure bases in Pakistan through Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Council.

So far there has been no official confirmation or denial of these reports by Pakistan. . . . The U.S. has created a military network in the Gulf against its rival Powers. In our view, Pakistan should be no party to it directly or indirectly. . . . Pakistan's non-aligned policies demand that it should keep away from super-Power rivalries.—MAGRABI PAKISTAN, July 20.

CSO: 4600/828

SWISS FIRMS READY FOR JOINT VENTURES

Karachi DAWN in English 1 Aug 83 p 12

[Text]

A study is currently being carried out by the Government of Switzerland to ascertain the number of firms interested in entering into joint venture projects with Pakistan and it has already evoked positive responses from 32 Swiss enterprises, the Swiss Ambassador in Pakistan, Mr Paul Wipfli told the members of the Pakistan-Switzerland Trade and Industry Committee.

He said the interested Swiss firms were mostly middle and small size organisations, and represented a broad spectrum of industry, ranging from solar energy and manufacture of agricultural implements, to fabrication of construction equipments and materials.

Regarding the imbalance in Pakistan-Switzerland Trade, he said this was likely to persist for some time. The deficit neutralised through financial contributions from Switzerland through assistance in technical cooperation pro-

jects (both on a bilateral and multilateral basis), investment by Swiss firms in Pakistan and financial assistance agreements, he added.

Mr Wipfli said financial assistance from his country to Pakistan was largely channelled towards agricultural projects, especially in the remote northern regions, and averaged between five and ten million US dollars annually.

Among these projects he mentioned dairy and milk processing enterprises in Faisalabad, small scale industries in Peshawar, a potato seed plant and 7.5 million dollar Swiss participation in a multilateral FAO-initiated grain storage depot construction programme.

The overall economic relationship between Pakistan and Switzerland could be described as "fairly balanced and sound", he concluded.—APP

CSO: 4600/828

PAKISTAN

RELEASE OF RUHMAN COMMISSION REPORT WOULD NOT HARM MILITARY

Rawalpindi HURMAT in Urdu 8-14 Jul 83 p 5

[Text] Publication of extracts from the Mumoodur Rahman Commission report by fearless Kashmiri newspaper NAWA-I-WAQT has annoyed the military. It has also revived a debate among the intelligentsia over the circumstances that on 16 December 1971 led the commander of the eastern command, Lieutenant General Niazi, to sign "surrender documents" as dictated by Gen Jagjit Singh Arora, as a result of which 92,000 compatriots had to suffer the ignominy of 2 years incarceration in Indian jails. In this controversy we have no hesitation in supporting the demand of intelligent circles that the Mumoodur Rahman Commission report now be released.

We do not agree with the view that publication of the report would hurt the military's standing in the eyes of the public or that it would lead to mud-slinging against the armed forces. To us, the tragedy of Eastern Pakistan was a political rather than a military defeat and the Pakistani people today have as much respect and regard for the army as they had before the Dacca surrender. If a few individuals and certain vanquished political parties today hold the military responsible for the secession of Eastern Pakistan, it is only because in 1971 Pakistan's affairs were in the hands of a military general (Yahya Khan). Therefore, we do not believe there is any danger that publication of the report would hurt the standing of military in the eyes of the Pakistani people.

Even if it is granted that publication of the Mumoodur Rahman Commission report would harm a few officers or, for the sake of argument, the entire service, even then from the point of view of the military the damage would be no greater than that from the book written by presidential aide Lt Col Sadbaq Salaq to dishonor and ridicule the defence forces. At every place in this book well-decorated officers are depicted as saying: "We will die the death of dogs." Hence, we don't believe that publication of the Rahman report can cause any further damage to the reputation of the military.

Publication of the report is also essential for an open investigation of the national criminals and to insure that they are punished for their misdeeds. Though it is true that the major political culprit of the Dacca surrender has met his terrible fate, the chief army brass of those days, General Niazi, remains to be dealt with.

Some people have charged that on the orders of the then governor and political administrator of East Pakistan, Maj Gen Rao Firman Ali Khan, 200 intellectuals of East Pakistan were murdered. We consider this charge baseless because on 16 December, when these intellectuals were murdered, both the Pakistani Government and the Pakistani Army had lost control of Dacca and law and order had passed into the hands of General Arora. Therefore, this massacre (as some Indian writers have themselves admitted) is the product of a Hindu mentality. Although trying other officers and men (who exhibited wonderful professional conduct in the most difficult situation) is a futile exercise, it is our considered opinion that General Niazi, the person responsible for guilty and culpable actions, should be put in the dock.

12286
CSO: 4656/229

PAKISTAN

BRIEFS

SIND POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTES--Two new polytechnic institutes will start functioning in Sind province during the next financial year, official sources told APP here yesterday. The new institutes are being opened in Mirpurkhas and Dadu and each will cost Rs. 12.6 million. The two institutes will start with Civil and electrical technologies. The Directorate of Technical Education has already started a new technical Institute at Jamia Millia Karachi with Radio-TV electronics and civil technology and 100 students have been admitted this year. The directorate has decided to provide additional facilities in the old polytechnic institutes at a cost of Rs. 4.5 million while Rs. 1,658 million will be spent on the replacement of machinery in Karachi and Saifi Polytechnic Institutes and Hyderabad Polytechnic Institute--APP. [Text] [Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 2 Aug 83 p 8]

UNDP ASSISTANCE--The UN Development Program is to provide assistance worth \$250,000 to implement a project in Pakistan on advice and training on regulating and negotiating with transnational corporations. The 3-year project, beginning in October, will be executed by the UN Center on Transnational Corporation. [Excerpt] [BK031419 Karachi Domestic Service in English 1005 GMT 3 Aug 83 BK]

TOBACCO PRODUCT EXPORTS--Pakistan exported 128 million rupees worth of tobacco and cigarette during financial year 1982-83. This reflects a 21 percent increase in tobacco and cigarette exports over last year's exports which totaled 106 million rupees. [Text] [Karachi Domestic Service in Urdu 0200 GMT 3 Aug 83 BK]

CSO: 4656/237

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